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China is unpopular for its policies on the Internet. However, we tend to forget that other 
countries and their economic actors also realise dubious practices on the Internet. This 
paper seeks to demonstrate the situation of human rights online in China shares 
common characteristics with the Internet policy of the European Union and some of its 
Member States. By choosing very specific examples, this paper offers a critical view of 
the Chinese Internet system, but also extends that criticism to certain practices in the 
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“And you shall know the truth, and  
the truth shall make you free.” 
 
John 8:32  
INTRODUCTION 
 
China has progressively become the country with the biggest number of netizens. It is 
estimated that among its 1.357-billion population,2 China has more than 641 million 
Internet users,3 which represents almost the triple of the figure of the second country 
with most users, the United States. If we consider that the Chinese population is four 
times bigger than the North American population, one can realise China’s potential.4 In 
fact, a study conducted by Microsoft shows that by 2025, 1.1 billion Chinese users will 
have access to the Internet, a figure which almost represents almost its entire 
population. Taking into account the worldwide number of Internet users expected by 
2025 (4.7 billion), it is an impressive figure. Yet, Chinese people are not expected to be 
the only predominant population online. By 2025, 75% of Internet users will come from 
emerging countries, the study adds.5 
 
Due to the large number of Internet users China has, and is expected to have in the 
coming years, it is no surprise that the Chinese government conceives the Internet as a 
source of development for the economy and society; a tool to modernise, reform the 
country and open-up its frontiers. Furthermore, the government recognises that the 
                                                          
2 The World Bank, China, available at http://data.worldbank.org/country/china (last visited on 19th 
October 2014) 
3 Nevertheless, “only just over 40 percent of individuals use the Internet on a regular basis and there are 
only 13 fixed broadband Internet subscriptions for every 100 people. (…). Mobile broadband Internet has 
registered more substantial growth, but its penetration is still low, with 17 subscriptions per 100 
population.” Cf. Bilbao-Osorio, B., Dutta, S. and Lanvin, B. (Edrs.), The Global Information Technology 
Report 2014 Rewards and Risks of Big Data, Insight Report - World Economic Forum and INSEAD, 
2014, p. 23, available at 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalInformationTechnology_Report_2014.pdf (last visited on 
25th April 2014).  
4 Data extracted from Internet Live Stats, Internet Users by Country, July 2014, available at 
http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users-by-country/ (last visited on 19th October 2014). 






(last visited on 20th June 2014). 
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Internet serves as a way to promote the government itself. These reasons explain why 
China has made a huge investment to build 8,267 million km of Internet infrastructure.6  
 
In line with its predominant political direction, China has enacted an extensive set of 
norms in order to regulate the Internet.7 The purported view of the Chinese government 
is to bring forth Internet legal and ethical education, maintain public order and security, 
protect minors and Intellectual Property (IP) rights, among other priorities. Chinese 
legislation covers regulations on inter alia Internet administration; security; data 
protection; state secrets; the ban on dissemination of sensitive information which may 
compromise state power, national harmony and unity, its honour, collective, social or 
state interests, the freedom or rights of other citizens; heresy, pornography, violence or 
terror. Put simply, the government’s vision includes setting up limits to the freedoms 
and human rights online of the Chinese citizens.  
 
Many scholars, public and private entities, civil society and human rights activists from 
around the world have criticised and still criticise China because of its Internet policies, 
its media and legal and political framework. Nevertheless, China is not the only country 
that has been or can be subject to criticism.  
 
This paper defends the thesis that there are some similarities between European 
countries and China when designing and implementing Internet-related policies. In 
particular, the present paper shows some European countries set up very similar grounds 
used by the Chinese government for restricting fundamental rights and freedoms online.  
                                                          
6 Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, White Paper on the Internet 
in China, Beijing, 8 June 2010, available at 
http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7093508.htm (last visited on 25th April 2014) 
7 As evidenced by the abovementioned White Paper, Op. cit., “[s]ince 1994 China has enacted a series of 
laws and regulations concerning Internet administration, including the Decision of the National People’s 
Congress Standing Committee on Guarding Electronic Signatures, Regulations on Telecommunications 
of the People’s Republic of China, Measures on the Administration of Internet Information Services, 
Regulations on the Protection of Computer Information System Security of the People’s Republic of 
China, Regulations on the Protection of the Right to Online Dissemination of Information, Provisions on 
the Administration of Foreign-funded Telecommunications Enterprises, Measures on the Administration 
of Security Protection of the International Networking of Computer Information Networks, Provisions on 
the Administration of Internet News Information Services, and Provisions on the Administration of 
Electronic Bulletin Services via the Internet, among others.” “Relevant provisions of the Criminal Law of 
the People’s Republic of China, General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China, 
Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China, Law of the People’s Republic of China on the 
Protection of Minors, Law of the People’s Republic of China on Punishments in Public Order and 
Security Administration and other laws are applicable in the case of Internet administration”. 
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However, this paper is not a comparative study between China the EU and/or its 
Member states. Instead, this paper selects examples to respond to the following research 
question: 
 
Are human rights online in China restricted in a similar way than in some EU 
Member States?  
 
By referring to concrete examples in several Member States of the European Union8, 
this paper strives to demonstrate that some practices conducted in China restricting 
human rights and fundamental freedoms online are sometimes conducted within the EU 
as well. In fact, some online practices in the context of the European Union can be put 
into question from the perspective of human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule 
of law.  
 
We are of the opinion that a comparative study is not very plausible, since China’s 
Internet policy is not comparable to the situation in the EU or any of its Member States. 
What this thesis tries to demonstrate is that although the EU area has a human rights 
protection framework, there are various similarities on the Internet between China and 
the EU. Our reasoning is fourfold: 
 
First, the Internet governance model pursued by China is different from the one 
defended by the European Union and its Member States, being the latter more open to 
the concept of ‘multistakeholderism’. One could therefore believe that the approaches to 
restrictions on human rights and fundamental freedoms are different in both sides. 
However, some instances show that this is not always the case within the EU.  
 
Second, when addressing the control mechanisms exercised in some EU countries to 
restrict access to the Internet and/or to its content, one can acknowledge the existence of 
resemblances with China. We develop some of them in this paper.  
 
Third, protection of human rights online and the right to obtaining effective remedies 
within the EU cannot be compared to the protection and remedies offered in practice in 
China. Yet, several examples happening within the EU show online restrictions to 
                                                          
8 We provide examples occurring in the United Kingdom (UK), France, Spain, Estonia or Austria. 
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fundamental rights and freedoms fall outside the rule of law – to the detriment of 
Internet users.  
 
On the Internet, online intermediaries play an important role, which leads us to our 
fourth and final point. In both the EU and China, Internet companies have progressively 
been conferred the power to police the Internet so as to pursue legitimate public policy 
objectives. Nevertheless, available evidence confirms the tendency of companies 
restricting human rights online without a clear, predictable or proportionate 
counterbalancing obligation not to act in an arbitrary way. In fact, private entities are 
not abiding by the positive human rights obligations that States must respect, which risk 
conflicting with businesses’ right to conduct business freely. 
 
In order to demonstrate the abovementioned hypothesis, we structured this paper into 
four chapters and a conclusion.  
 
The first chapter provides an overview of the Internet governance models available and 
the ones defended by China and the EU, respectively. The EU considers the Internet 
should be governed in a different way than China. However, we point out flaws in both 
positions, which clearly affects the approach towards human rights online of each party. 
Therefore, this chapter sets up the basis for discussion. 
 
The second chapter explores the different forms of Internet control in both parties. It 
first explains how the internet works in terms of access and content. The second chapter 
addresses the forms of Internet control in China and how that affects Internet users’ 
access to the Internet and to its content in China. After exploring the Chinese situation, 
we demonstrate EU countries also adopt several methods of control and therefore 
restrict freedom of communication in certain instances. 
 
The third chapter explores the human rights online situation in both China and the 
European Union. In particular, it focuses on the restrictions to freedom of expression 
and the right to privacy as well as the different ways for Internet users to obtain redress.  
 
Before reaching a conclusion in chapter five, the fourth chapter discusses how the 
Internet can be used as a means of control  in order to achieve public policy objectives, 
  Maryant Nathalie Fernández Pérez 
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such as national security or child protection, and explains the important role that online 
intermediaries play in that regard. 
 
I. INTERNET GOVERNANCE 
 
In order to explore the human rights situation within China and some EU countries, the 
first thing one needs to understand is how the Internet is governed from the perspective 
of both parties. This chapter first explores the Internet governance models available, 
mainly ‘interstate participation’ and ‘multistakeholderism’. Secondly, it provides a 
critical review of both models. This will allow the reader not only to understand the 
differences of the Chinese approach and the EU approach (and therefore, EU countries 
in general), but also the main concerns about each model. Finally, this chapter provides 
the reader with hints on the possible future of Internet governance in order to frame the 
human rights discussions in each party both at present and in the future.   
 
But what is Internet governance? 
 
There is no consensus among scholars, civil society, the technical community, industry 
stakeholders or governments on the definition of Internet governance. The Working 
Group on Internet Governance set up by the Secretary-General of the United Nations9 in 
December 2003 attempted to define it as the “development and application by 
Governments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared 
principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the 
evolution and use of the Internet”.10 Conversely, scholars like researcher Julien Nocetti 
consider that the meaning of the word “governance” guides the discussions around the 
topic in different directions. According to Nocetti, whereas the French expression 
“governance de l’internet” seems to refer to an external element that influences the 
Internet, the English version “Internet governance” refers to the specific ways in which 
the Internet is governed.11 For the purposes of this paper, we follow the English 
                                                          
9 WGIG, Report of the Working Group on Internet Governance, June 2005, p.3, available at 
http://www.wgig.org/docs/WGIGREPORT.pdf (last visited on 12th May 2015). 
10 Ibid, p. 4. 
11 Institut Français des Relations Internationales (Nocetti, J., coord.), Internet: une gouvernance 
inachevée, Politique étrangère, n° 4, hiver 2014-2015, p.10. 
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language expression and the WGIG’s definition12. We further examine the technical 
aspects of the Internet and its management in Chapter two. 
 
1. Models of Internet governance 
 
The discussion on what we should consider as the most adequate model to run the 
Internet dates back to the end of the 90s, when the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (ICANN) was created – an organisation that we will describe later 
on. Traditionally, international law provided governance solutions solely involving 
States. Through a certain degree of cooperation and interaction, States reach agreements 
at regional or international level. This is the model that China has adopted at a global 
level. More recently, another type of Internet governance has gained wider acceptance. 
It is a model that claims to involve virtually all Internet actors. This model is often 
called “multistakeholderism” and has been officially endorsed by the European Union. 
For the purposes of this paper,13 we thus regroup the Internet governance models into 
two, the interstate model and multistakeholderism. 
 
The first type of Internet governance model is the ‘intestate model’, according to 
which States gather together to provide the principles and roadmap to govern the 
Internet. As previously stated, China encourages this type of model, as it considers the 
Internet should remain under the sovereignty of each country. In the international arena, 
China praises the United Nations (UN) for the role it plays on the Internet. China 
“supports the establishment of an authoritative and just international administration 
organisation under the UN system”. At the same time, it emphasises that the process 
shall be globally done in a democratic way (emphasis added). China is therefore a 
country that is vastly represented at the World Summit on the Information Society 
(WSIS), as the Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of 
China referred to in its 2010 White paper on the Internet. 14  
                                                          
12 Definition included in the Tunis Agenda of the World Summit on the Information Society. Cf. WSIS, 
Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/6(Rev. 1)-E, 18th November 2005, 
paragraphs 33 and 34, available at http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.html (last visited on 26th 
May 2015). 
13 We omit references to other Internet governance models, e.g. the auto-regulation model, in which the 
Internet would be governed by the market itself or by a technical or scientific community. See, for 
instance, Institut Français des Relations Internationales (Nocetti, J., coord.), Op. cit. 
14 Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Op. cit. 
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The WSIS was established by the UN General Assembly Resolution 56/183 of 21st 
December 2001, following ITU’s Resolution of 1998.15 The WSIS was organised by the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), a specialised UN agency, with the view 
to discussing “the implications of the emerging information society.” 16 The WSIS had 
two phases. The first one was held in Geneva on 10-12 December 2003, as a result of 
which a Declaration of Principles and a Plan of Action were adopted. The second phase 
took place at Tunis on 16-18 November 2005. The so-called ‘Tunis Commitment’ and 
its Agenda included Internet governance among its topics, documents which prepared 
the ground for an implementation and follow-up plan. Throughout those two phases, the 
ITU was assisted by a high-level committee and a preparatory committee, in which 
China took part. The function of the latter was to discuss textual proposals before they 
were addressed at each stage of the WSIS. 17 
 
Ultimately, WSIS’ main goal was to purportedly build an inclusive Information 
Society.18 However, the WSIS did not follow a very democratic process. Initially, it was 
designed for high-level representatives of the States. Later on, a multistakeholder 
approach was introduced. Nonetheless, stakeholders only acquired the status of 
observers, so they did not have the power to decide. Yet, criticism mainly expressed by 
civil society regarding WSIS relates to its main organiser, the ITU. First, although 
established by international law (at UN level), the ITU only issues recommendations. 
Secondly, it is highly criticised for following a top-down system in which participation 
is subject to membership fees19 and stakeholders are not given much of a say because 
intergovernmental views are imposed, since it is a centralised system. Thirdly, ITU is 
accused of being largely influenced by the US.20  
 
                                                          
15 ITU, Resolution 73 of the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference, Minneapolis, 1998, available at 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/background/resolutions/73.html (last visited on 26th May 2015). 
16 Internet Society, Understanding the WSIS+10 Review Process, The UN and its 10-year Review of the 
WSIS in December 2015, May 2015, available at 
https://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/WSISplus10-Overview.pdf (last visited on 26th May 
2015). 
17 See ITU, Basic Information - Frequently asked questions, available at 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/basic/faqs.asp (last visited on 12th February 2015). 
18 Internet Society, Op. Cit. 
19ITU, Membership, available at https://www.itu.int/en/about/Pages/membership.aspx (last visited on 15th 
February 2015). 
20 Masnick, M., Tell The UN To Keep Its Hands Off The People's Internet, 1st June 2012, available at 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120601/10182719172/tell-un-to-keep-its-hands-off-peoples-
Internet.shtml (last visited on 17th June 2014). 
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The goals set as a result of the WSIS were scheduled to be reviewed in December 2015 
through the so-called “WSIS+10” process. In fact, “the Tunis Agenda called upon the 
UN General Assembly [to] conduct an overall review of the implementation of WSIS 
outcomes in 2015”.21 Throughout the WSIS action plan and implementation, the ITU 
collaborated with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
(UNESCO) and other UN bodies, such as the UN’s Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) or the UN’s Commission on Science and Technology for Development 
(CSTD).22 
 
As expressed at the beginning of this chapter, the obvious example of the interstate 
model is China. According to China’s Internet vision, nations are the sole sovereign 
authorities to establish what triggers Internet security and responses. Different visions 
ought to be respected and, in order to comply with international practices, countries 
need to cooperate and collaborate within the international arena. Pursuant to the Chinese 
government’s views, China collaborates and cooperates with other countries. In other 
words, China welcomes interstate participation to govern the Internet on an 
international, regional or a multilateral basis, through inter alia the WSIS (and 
WSIS+10), the ASEAN or the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). For instance, 
in 2010 China is reported to have sent representatives to international meetings and set 
up delegations in more than 40 countries to observe and learn from them. Additionally, 
China recognised having entered into bilateral agreements with countries like the US, 
the UK, Germany, Italy, Hong Kong23 or with Russia. In the latter case, for example, 
Russia and China entered into a cybersecurity agreement on 30 April 2015,24 which 
builds upon previous alliances in the Internet world.25 
 
                                                          
21 Brown, D., and Kaspar, L., Everything you need to know about the WSIS+10 review, Association for 
Progressive Communications News, 28th January 2015, available at 
https://www.apc.org/en/news/everything-you-need-know-about-wsis10-review (last visited on 26th May 
2015). 
22 Internet Society, Op. cit. 
23 Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Op. cit. 
24 Kulicova, A., China-Russia cyber-security pact: Should the US be concerned?, Russia Direct, 21st May 
2015, available at http://www.russia-direct.org/analysis/china-russia-cyber-security-pact-should-us-be-
concerned (last visited on 1st June 2015). 
25 Commissioner for Human Rights, The rule of law on the Internet and in the wider digital world, Issue 
Paper, CommDH/IssuePaper(2014)1 prepared by Prof. Douwe Korff, Council of Europe, 8th December 
2014, pp. 40 and 41, available at 
https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=2
734552&SecMode=1&DocId=2262340&Usage=2 (last visited on 1st June 2015). 
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In sum, while defending a state-sovereign Internet, “China has moved from rejection of 
international institutions to sustained, deep engagement”.26 In practice, however, 
China’s international participation is not a synonym of respect of Internet users’ human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. While Article 3(3) of  the Russia-China cybersecurity 
agreement example mentioned above, commits to develop and promote international 
law norms to ensure national and international information security, Article 4(2) allows 
restrictions to the fundamental freedoms to seek, receive and disseminate information to 
be imposed by the legislation of the other country to ensure “national security”.27 
 
The second model of Internet governance involves the participation of different 
actors. Under the ‘network of networks’ model, there is no one actor which runs the 
Internet. In fact, this model was proposed as an alternative to the proposals from the 
Internet Society (ISOC)28 or the ITU. This model was further developed under the 
WSIS29 and more recently in NETmundial and the UN Internet Governance Forum 
(IGF). Even the ITU made some progress in its meeting in Busan 2014. One type of the 
‘network of networks’ model is the so-called ‘multistakeholderism’, which is supported 
by the EU and its institutions and by most civil society organisations.30 So, because 
multistakeholder mechanisms have the potential to include a wide range of 
stakeholders; the Internet is not run by a moral or legal person, by a government or 
various countries. To the contrary, the Internet is or should be governed by 
“multistakeholders”. 
 
The principle of multistakeholderism implies the inclusion of the various actors in the 
decision-taking process. That includes all international organisations, companies, the 
                                                          
26 Hachigian, N., Chen, W. and Beddor,C., China’s New Engagement in the International System. In the 
ring, but punching below its weight, Center for American Progress, November 2009, p. 12, available at 
http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2009/11/pdf/chinas_new_engagement.pdf 
(last visited on 31st March 2014) 
27 Government of the Russian Federation, Order No. 788-p on signing the Agreement between the 
Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the People's Republic of China regarding 
International CyberSecurity, 30th April 2015, available at  
http://government.ru/media/files/5AMAccs7mSlXgbff1Ua785WwMWcABDJw.pdf (last visited on 1st 
June 2015). 
28 For information concerning the ISOC, see http://icannwiki.com/index.php/Internet_Society (last visited 
on 17th June 2014). 
29 Kleinwächter, W, Beyond ICANN Vs ITU? How WSIS Tries to Enter the New Territory of Internet 
Governance, 2004 Gazette 66 (3-4): 233–51; cf. Musiani, F. and Pohle, J., NETmundial: only a landmark 
event if 'Digital Cold War' rhetoric abandoned, 27th March 2014, available at 
http://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/netmundial-only-landmark-event-if-digital-cold-war-rhetoric-
abandoned (last visited on 17th June 2014). 
30 This model has been  
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civil society, the technical community, scholars, public authorities and the netizens. 
More precisely, an Internet run by a multistakeholder approach includes civil society; 
the Industry; Academia; Technical experts, but also the ICANN; the Internet 
Architecture Board (IAB), which deals with technical and engineering aspects of the 
Internet, supervising the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and the Internet 
Research Task Force (IRTF); the IGF, whose aim is to gather global multistakeholders 
to discuss Internet governance issues and whose mandate, initially ending in 2015, has 
been subject to extension requests;31 Governments and Inter-governmental 
organisations, such as the European Union, the International Organisation for 
Standarisation, Maintenance Agency (ISO 3166 MA), the Internet Society (ISOC), the 
5th Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) or the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C); as 
well as Internet Network Operators’ Groups.32 
 
In practice, it is harder to ensure all actors are represented within the multistakeholder 
model. However, the criteria and the mere possibility to be present and have an 
influence on the decision-making process, even if the outcome is generally not binding, 
is remarkably different to the interstate model. In the multistakeholder model, it is 
essential that all actors enjoy the same level of importance or at least that the procedure 
respects the principle of equality. 
  
The level of democracy within the principle of multistakeholderism has been criticised 
because it does not resolve the deficiencies of power structures in practice. The positive 
side is that if stakeholders refuse to participate, such behaviour can put the legitimacy of 
an initiative into question.33 An example can be the European Commission’s 
multistakeholder project called ‘Licenses for Europe’, which was dropped due to 
                                                          
31 For instance, on 11th February 2015, the European Parliament adopted a Resolution (i.e. a political 
statement which is non-binding) inter alia asking for the IGF renewal at the UN General Assembly in 
December 2015. Cf. European Parliament, Resolution on the renewal of the mandate of the Internet 
Governance Forum, 2015/2526(RSP), 11th February 2015, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2015-
0033+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=GA (last visited on 1st June 2015). 
32 ICANN, Infographic, Who Runs the Internet?, 2013, available at 
www.xplanations.com/whorunstheinternet (last visited on 2nd January 2015). 
33 IGFWatch news, Debunking eight myths about multi-stakeholderism, 25th April 2015, available at 
http://igfwatch.org/discussion-board/debunking-eight-myths-about-multi-stakeholderism (last visited on 
26th April 2015). 
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concerns raised by several stakeholders.34 But is multistakeholderism better than the 
interstate model? 
 
2. Analysing multistakeholderism 
 
This study argues that an appropriate multistakeholder model ought to allow the 
creation of models of Internet governance based on a bottom-up approach, being free, 
open and ensuring all actors are represented in the forums to be constructed.  
 
In principle, there is no obvious reason to think multistakeholderism is a bad approach 
because it brings everybody on board. In theory, it gives stakeholders the opportunity to 
express their views and have the ability to have them taken into account. Evidence 
however shows that one of the most common problems of the multistakeholder model 
resides in the distribution of power. Although participation is in principle inclusive, 
governments or intergovernmental agencies and even corporations often play a greater 
role.35 If inclusiveness is not fulfilled, negotiations may not be driven by the common 
good.  
 
On 23rd and 24th April 2014, the multistakeholder approach was tested at NETmundial, 
the Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance, which was 
held in Brazil.  
 
Stakeholders generally had big aspirations on NETmundial as they believed it would 
provide a more decentralised model as compared to the WSIS; a model less dominated 
by the US.  
 
The expectations on NETMundial’s outcomes increased when the US Commerce 
Department’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) 
announced36 its desire to bring changes to the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority 
                                                          
34 For more information, see, for example, EDRi, Failure Of “Licenses For Europe”, 20th November 
2013, available at https://edri.org/failure-of-licenses-for-europe/ (last visited on 26th April 2015).  
35 See principle nine of EDRi’s Digital Rights Charter https://www.wepromise.eu/en/page/charter (last 
visited on 17th June 2014).  
36 See http://www.Internetgovernance.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2014-03-ICANN-IANA-Role-
Structures.pdf (last visited on 17th June 2014).  
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(IANA) function and the debate on ICANN.37 In this sense, NETmundial appeared as a 
transition of the ICANN and the IANA situation.38 
  
ICANN is an organisation which mainly manages and coordinates three functions. First, 
the domain names available on the Internet –what is called the “Domain Name System” 
(DNS)–. Second, Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. Third, protocol port and parameter 
numbers. Having its main offices in Los Angeles, Singapore and Istanbul, it has several 
engagement centres, including Beijing and Brussels’.39 For its part, IANA “is 
responsible for global coordination of the Internet Protocol addressing systems, as well 
as the Autonomous System Numbers used for routing Internet traffic.”40 IANA was 
configured as a department of the ICANN. Nonetheless, on 14th March 2014 the U.S. 
Commerce Department’s National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration (NTIA) announced its intention to transition IANA to “the global 
multistakeholder community”, so the contract with ICANN would expire41 in 
September 2015, with a margin of manoeuvre of at least two extra years. 
 
From an EU perspective, the European Commission welcomed the transition42, as it 
had previously declared.43 On 10th June 2014, the former Vice-president of the 
European Commission, Ms. Neelie Kroes, expressed a more nuanced view at the WSIS 
                                                          




Center+for+Global+Communication+Studies+%28CGCS%29%29 (last visited on 17th June 2014). 
38 DomainNewsAfrica, A transition to decentralized Internet, but will we get there by 2015?, 27th March 
2014, available at http://domainnewsafrica.com/a-transition-to-decentralized-Internet-but-will-we-get-
there-by-2015/ (last visited on 17th June 2014).  
39 For more information, see Zalnieriute, M. and Schneider, T., ICANN’s procedures and policies in the 
light of human rights, fundamental freedoms and democratic values, Expert Report for the Council of 
Europe, DGI(2014)12, 16 June 2014, available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/dataprotection/TPD_documents/ICANN-
PoliciesProcedures%2816June2014%29.pdf  (last visited on 4th December 2014).  
40 IANA, Number resources, available at https://www.iana.org/numbers (last visited on 2nd June 2015).  
41 NTIA, NTIA Announces Intent to Transition Key Internet Domain Name Functions, 14th March 2014, 
available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-
domain-name-functions (last visited on 20th June 2014) 
42 European Commission, Towards further Globalisation of the Internet, Press release, 15th March 2014, 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-70_en.htm (last visited on 20th June 
2014) 
43 E.g. In the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the Internet Policy and 
Governance Europe's role in shaping the future of Internet Governance, COM/2014/072 final, 12th 
February 2014, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0072&from=EN (last visited on 20th June 2014). 
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in Geneva. In fact, she welcomed the USA’s decision to “transition core Internet 
functions for more open management and stronger accountability”, but seemed more 
sceptical about its follow-up. According to the European Commission, the Internet shall 
be inclusive in the sense of including developing countries.44 Moreover, former 
Commissioner Neelie Kroes qualified the Internet as being open, unified and global and 
urged for its governance to be “[o]pen and transparent, global and multi-stakeholder”.45 
Such qualifiers go along with the European Parliament’s view of the Internet as “a 
global public good”. Its “governance should be exercised in the common interest”, from 
the perspective of the Parliament.46 
 
As for NETMundial in particular, the European Commission welcomed the outcome of 
the Brazilian meeting47 even though experts considered this should not be the case 
because one of the main policy demands of Commissioner Kroes in NETmundial was 
the exclusion of intermediary liability from the final document and the essence of this 
demand was not respected.48   
 
From a Chinese perspective, multistakeholderism is not considered to be an adequate 
approach. In fact, China replied to the public consultation carried out at NETmundial, 
rejecting multistakeholderism and reinforcing its sovereign position over the Internet. 
This approach was already presented in December 2012, at the World Conference on 
International Telecommunications (WCIT). 49 The ITU organised the WCIT, which was 
categorised by the press as a confrontation between two visions in Internet 
governance.50 
 
                                                          
44 It is important that developing countries further engage in the Internet governance discussions. In fact, 
it is estimated that in 2025 nearly 69% of people in emerging economies will be using the Internet. If we 
take into account that in developed countries that percentage increases up to 91% of the population, 
“internet dependence will not just be a concept, but rather the new reality”, as evidenced by a recent 
report of Microsoft on the future of cyberspace. Cf. Microsoft, Cyberspace 2025…Op. cit., p. 2. 
45 European Commission, Inclusive governance for a global Internet, press release (speech), 10th June 
2014, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-447_en.htm  (last visited on 20th June 
2014). 
46 European Parliament, Resolution on internet governance: the next steps, (2009/2229(INI)), 15th June 
2010, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2010-
0208&language=EN (last visited on 2nd June 2015).  
47 Kroes, N., My thoughts on NETmundial and the Future of Internet Governance, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/kroes/en/content/my-thoughts-netmundial-and-future-
internet-governance (last visited on 11th June 2014). 
48 See for instance McNamee, J., NETmundial…, Op. cit. 
49 See http://www.itu.int/en/wcit-12/Pages/default.aspx (last visited on 17th June 2014). 
50 Musiani, F. and Pohle, J., Op. cit.; Cf. Wagner, B., Op. Cit. 
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As in the WCIT, China presented its views at NETMundial51 together with Russia and 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.52 In short, China defended a model in which States should 
remain in power. The four countries want an international voluntary code of conduct of 
behaviour for states with the aim of achieving international consensus. They highlighted 
the need of cooperation and coordination, but at the State and the UN level, as well as at 
the level of other international and regional organisations. The code of conduct 
proposed,  
“[e]ach State voluntarily subscribing to the code pledges: […] (e) To reaffirm all the 
rights and responsibilities of States to protect, in accordance with relevant laws and 
regulations, their information space and critical information infrastructure from threats, 
disturbance, attack and sabotage”. 
 
From our perspective, which is close to civil society, however, neither of the positions 
of the EU or of countries like China seem to draw the right balance. NETMundial went 
beyond the Tunis Agenda within the WSIS, making some progress both substantially 
and formally, and being more respectful as regards fundamental rights and freedoms 
online as compared to the Chinese proposal. However, NETMundial is not exempt from 
criticism, as explained below.  
 
On the one hand, participation was important as part of the multistakeholderism 
approach. In NETMundial, all actors, whether public authorities, the industry, the 
technical community, civil society or users, were given the opportunity to submit their 
views at a first stage on Internet governance and present a roadmap for the future.53  
During the meetings in São Paolo, remote participation was possible as well. Whereas 
the process was deemed to be participatory, the forum missed some key contributions. 
According to the preamble of the final document of NETMundial, only “thousands of 
people”54 provided their comments on a topic that affects the whole world.  
 
As far as governments were concerned, for example, there was a lack of representation 
from African and Latin-American countries. Developing countries were greatly 
underrepresented.  In addition, many European governments did not submit a response 
                                                          
51 See the whole response at http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/international-code-of-conduct-for-
information-security/67 (last visited on 17th June 2014). 
52 Musiani, F. and Pohle, J., Op. cit.; Cf. Wagner, B., Op. Cit. 
53 See the analysis conducted to ascertain the times ‘multistakeholderim’ appears in the different 
submissions received at NETmundial at http://ajantriks.github.io/netmundial/track_multistakeholder.html 
(last visited on 18th June 2014). 
54 As stated in the preamble of NETmundial’s final document. 
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to the consultation, such as Portugal, Italy, Ireland or Belgium.55 As for the private 
sector, most of the views on the subject came from US companies.56 Notwithstanding 
the involvement of several stakeholders, some meetings were withheld from public 
discussions and certain meetings could not be followed remotely.  
 
Important topics were delayed for later discussion. For instance, the outcome of the 
NETMundial Forum, the so-called ‘NETMundial Multistakeholder Document’,57 
discarded Internet management and opted to refer to Internet governance.58 Indeed, 
whereas China pleaded for an Internet management system in its response to the public 
consultation at NETmundial, that approach was not adopted.  
 
Traffic management is a net neutrality issue that NETMundial could have addressed, but 
it did not. Internet management is linked, or may be linked with traffic management. 
Traffic management is not wrong per se. Certain flexibility is needed in very 
exceptional and framed circumstances. However, traffic management measures are used 
as a means to discriminate on the basis of content, destination or type of data, therefore 
representing a violation of the most important principle of the Internet, that is, net 
neutrality. If arbitrarily imposed, traffic management measures on the Internet can 
undermine the rule of law and freedom of communication. Very sensitive topics, such 
as child protection may justify traffic management measures. The problem is that a valid 
public interest can turn into a means to filter more and not just content that does not 
seem ‘appropriate’ for children, for instance. In such a case, those measures may 
become disproportionate and applied in a discriminatory way.59  
 
Moreover, the NETMundial Multistakeholder Document posed several problems, which 
could be summarised non-exhaustively as follows. 
 
                                                          
55 See http://ajantriks.github.io/netmundial/map_no_contrib_govt.html (last visited on 18th June 2014). 
56 See the analysis conducted on the origin of the submissions divided by categories of stakeholders at 
http://ajantriks.github.io/netmundial/contributions_org_type.html (last visited on 18th June 2014). 
57See the final document at http://netmundial.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NETmundial-
Multistakeholder-Document.pdf  (last visited on 17th June 2014). 
58 Muller, M., NETmundial moves net governance beyond WSIS, 27th April 2014, available at 
http://www.Internetgovernance.org/2014/04/27/NETmundial-moves-net-governance-beyond-wsis/ (last 
visited on 17th June 2014). 
59 Ibid. 
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First, even if decisions were supposed to be taken by consensus, NETMundial reflected 
what happened at the 2013 ITU treaty conference in Dubai, that is, many countries 
joined Russia, Iran and China,60 asking the UN to play the main role in Internet 
Governance.  The text mentions ‘consensus’ on multiple occasions referring to the way 
recommendations and decisions need to take place in the field of Internet governance. 
Nonetheless, the document nuanced ‘consensus’ with many adjectives, such as ‘broad 
consensus’, ‘rough consensus’ or consensus ‘to the extent possible’. Put simply, 
NETMundial was not a real-consensus process.61  
 
Secondly, NETMundial’s final document also addressed transparency and 
accountability.   
 
On the one hand, transparency is a great tool. It does not solely refer to being objective. 
Transparency is not enough by itself, indeed. For instance, there is a certain degree of 
transparency in China to the extent that we become aware of certain number of abuses 
of law or restrictions to freedom of expression. Nevertheless, if citizens cannot, or the 
government is not willing to, do anything meaningful to combat abuses and human 
rights restrictions, transparency will never be enough. 
 
On the other hand, accountability fills the gap transparency alone cannot. Transparency 
without accountability would seem like when Google issues a transparency report 
informing of a government’s request to shutdown content or request for users' data.62 
That is why accountability needs to be stressed in discussing measures to protect 
freedom of expression, freedom of communication, e-accessibility or privacy rights.63 
 
To start with, publishing data is not enough. Raw data needs to be put in context. 
Information should be relevant and accessible at the right time (at an early stage) and be 
as accurate as possible. When we add accountability to that, we allow all stakeholders, 
from the top to the bottom, i.e. from public authorities to legal and natural persons to 
                                                          
60 Genachowski, J. and Goldstein, G.M., 'Global' Internet Governance Invites Censorship, 3rd April 2014, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303978304579471670854356630 
(last visited on 18th June 2014) 
61 http://www.igovernment.in/igov/editorial/39494/consensus-netmundial (last visited on 18th June 2014). 
62 See Google, Transparency report, available at http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/?hl=en-GB 
and McNamee, J., Google’s right to be forgotten – industrial scale of misinformation, 19th June 2014, 
available at http://edri.org/forgotten/ (last visited on 16th June 2014).  
63 See http://www.transparency-initiative.org/about/definitions (last visited on 13th June 2014). 
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respond for their actions and make available appropriate redress mechanisms. For 
instance, being assessed by various standards, being subject to periodic investigation, 
being held liable for allegedly illegal conduct and judicial redress, among others. 
 
Fourthly, whereas NETmundial’s biggest achievement is the declaration of the Internet 
as an open and global resource, NETMundial has been highly criticised for the use of 
concepts of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), which was rejected 
inter alia by the European Parliament in 2012. For instance, the executive Director of 
the umbrella organisation European Digital Rights (EDRi), Joe McNamee, warned of 
the dangers of referring to ‘fair process’. According him, ‘fair process’ offers no 
guarantees, as it is neither an equivalent word for “fair trial” nor “due process”, which 
are the concepts established under international law.64 
 
3. The future of Internet governance 
 
In the near future, Internet governance discussions are expected to take place in 
different fora. Following professor Kleinwächter, the near future of Internet governance 
could be summarised as follows: 
 
From a technical point of view, the near future looks like it be dedicated to ascertain 
how the IANA will be handled by an accountable multistakeholder mechanism. 
 
From a political point of view, the IANA contract would ideally need to transition into a 
multistakeholder management approach, as scheduled. Otherwise, Kleinwächter 
foresees that the WSIS 10+ conference would be used by some countries to plead for a 
“multilateral governmental oversight” instead. Also, the mandate of the Internet 
Governance Forum (IGF) would need to be adopted, following the 69th UN General 
Assembly’s failure to do that.65 In addition, as a follow up to NETMundial, the 
                                                          
64 McNamee, J., NETmundial, multistakeholderism and fair process, 7th May 2014, available at 
http://edri.org/enditorial-netmundial-multistakeholderism-and-fair-process/ (last visited on 20th June 
2014).  
65 Kleinwächter, W., Internet Governance Outlook 2015: Two Processes, Many Venues, Four Baskets, 3rd 
January 2015, available at 
http://www.circleid.com/posts/20150103_internet_governance_outlook_2015_2_processes_many_venues
_4_baskets/ (last visited on 16th January 2015). 
  Maryant Nathalie Fernández Pérez 
                 
 
 21 
Internet Control: assessing China in a comparative European context 
NETMundial Initiative66 was set up and managed by the Brazilian Internet Steering 
Committee, the World Economic Forum or ICANN. Civil society organisations have 
joined forces with other organisations, such as the Just Net Coalition67 or the World 
Social Forum, which is a civil society alternative to the World Economic forum. 
 
From a policy point of view, Kleinwächter considers there should be an agenda for 
Internet Governance by 2025, which should include issues related to cybersecurity, 
cybereconomy, human rights and technology developments.68 
  
II. INTERNET CONTROL 
 
The Internet is a “global facility available to the public”69. From a technical point of 
view, that means that the Internet is “a global system of interconnected computer 
networks”.70 One device can communicate with another device because they all use the 
same language, the Internet Protocol (IP). On top of the Internet protocol, different 
protocols or conventions work to allow data flows. The Internet has the potential to be 
fully open and flexible insofar as a single language is used for all communications and 
content is transferred by conventions or protocols that are built on the Internet Protocol. 
The Internet was thus created with no limits to innovation, openness or flexibility.71 
 
However, several techniques and actions are put in place in order to jeopardise the 
openness of the Internet. Whether by states, companies, individuals or groups of 
individuals, the Internet can be subject to control. Contrary to Internet governance, 
Internet control does not solve the question of who should or does run the Internet, but 
shows how the open, flexible, innovative nature of the Internet can be controlled – to 
the detriment of end-users and the essence of its value for society. 
 
                                                          
66 https://www.netmundial.org/about (last visited on 16th January 2015). 
67 http://justnetcoalition.org (last visited on 16th January 2015). 
68 Kleinwächter, W., Op cit. 
69 As defined by the World Summit on the Information Society. Cf. WSIS, Geneva Declaration of 
Principles, WSIS-03/GENEVA/DOC/0004, Geneva, 10th-12th December 2003, para. 48, available at 
http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-s/md/03/wsis/doc/S03-WSIS-DOC-0004!!PDF-E.pdf (last visited on 11th 
January 2015). 
70 EDRi, How the Internet Works. A guide for policy-makers, The EDRi papers, Issue 03, 23rd January 
2012, p. 3, available at  http://www.edri.org/files/2012EDRiPapers/how_the_internet_works.pdf (last 
visited on 12th October 2014). 
71 Ibid. pp. 3 and 4. 
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In this chapter we demonstrate how access to the Internet is the first step to have access 
to the full range of benefits of the Internet. Access to the Internet is often controlled and 
sometimes prevented not only in China, but also within the European Union. 
Accordingly, this chapter gives an overview of the different ways both China and the 
European Union or its Member states control the Internet, namely, through censorship, 
through the role of intermediaries and self-censorship. This overview demonstrates that 
within the EU, there are approaches which lead to unreasonable, unjustified and/or 
disproportionate approaches. Among the levels of control which can be exercised over 
the Internet, intermediaries play a key role. 
 
1. Access to the Internet and to its Content. 
 
In order to enjoy all the possibilities the Internet offers, everyone should have access to 
the Internet. It is the starting point. According to ITU Statistics, in 2013, 2.7 billion 
people used the Internet.72 At the end of 2014, ITU reported that the Internet counted 3 
billion users. What is more, the prospect for Internet user penetration is bigger because 
it is calculated that 4.3 billion people are not connected yet, of which 90% live in 
developing countries.73 In this sense, there are differences between countries around the 
world,74 including within China and the EU. The level of Internet penetration in the 
European Union is different to the one experimented in China. 
 
On the other hand, the Internet “is becoming each day larger [but] more fractured”, as 
Parfrey argues.75 The Internet works as a human rights enhancer thanks to the principle 
                                                          
72 For the purposes of the ITU 2014 report, “Internet users” "refers to people who used the Internet from 
any location and for any purpose, irrespective of the device and network used, in the last three months.” 
Cf. ITU, Measuring the Information Society Report 2014, 24th November 2014, pp. 15 and 222, available 
at   
http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Documents/publications/mis2014/MIS2014_without_Annex_4.pdf 
(last visited on 5th January 2015). 
73 Ibid., p. 15. 
74 In recent years, price discrimination practices (such as zero rating) are having a destructive effect of 
restricted access. See, for instance, AccessNow, Policy Brief: Access’ position on zero rating schemes, 
2015, available at https://s3.amazonaws.com/access.3cdn.net/d812d59f706c3e8a75_w0m6iipn5.pdf (last 
visited on 27th July 2015). 
75 Palfrey, J. G., Local Nets on a Global Network: Filtering and the Internet Governance Problem. THE 
GLOBAL FLOW OF INFORMATION, Harvard Law School, Public Law & Legal Theory Paper Series, 
Working Paper No. 10-41, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1655006 (last visited on 31st March 
2014). 
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of net neutrality, which is a term coined by Professor Tim Wu.76 Net neutrality is a 
principle according to which every point on the network can connect to another point, 
without discrimination on the basis of origin, destination or type of data. In order words, 
internet traffic is treated equally.77 Net neutrality is about freedom of communication, 
encryption, privacy and the rule of law. Non-neutrality means that we are no longer free 
to receive and impart the information of our choice. We would be locked into a closed 
environment. When we lose on net neutrality78, we lose on our freedom to receive and 
particularly to impart information. But we also lose when ISPs police the Internet (as 
they will no longer be able to credibly claim a "mere conduit" liability exception). In 
this sense, voluntary measures to block or discriminate on content raise legal concerns 
vis-à-vis the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union79 and the e-Privacy Directive,80 including 
respect of confidentiality of communications. 
 
In the European Union, authorities focus on providing EU citizens with a high-speed 
broadband access. Access to basic broadband was one of the first problems tackled by 
the EU Digital Agenda. According to the European Commission, this problem has been 
nearly been solved. In fact, most of the legislative proposals and policy documents 
adopted put their emphasis on education, capability building, access to the digital 
arena81 or even on the need to include rural areas or developing countries. 
 
As regards net neutrality, however, it has been hard for the EU to find a common 
ground to deliver on its political promises on net neutrality.82 In 2013 the European 
                                                          
76 Wu, T., A proposal for Network Neutrality, June 2002, available at 
http://www.timwu.org/OriginalNNProposal.pdf (last visited on 21st June 2015). 
77 EDRi, Net neutrality, The EDRi papers, Issue 08, 22nd December 2013, available at 
https://edri.org/files/paper08_netneutrality.pdf (last visited on 29th January 2015) 
78 See more information on Belli, L. and De Filippi, P. (Eds.), The Value of Network Neutrality for the 
Internet of Tomorrow, Report of the Dynamic Coalition on Network Neutrality, November 2013. 
79 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12010P&from=EN (last visited on 3rd August 2015). 
80 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector, 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002L0058:en:HTML (last 
visited on 3rd August 2015). 
81 Fernández Pérez, M., EC’s Scoreboard 2014: Broadband access improved, challenges remain, 4th June 
2014, available at http://edri.org/ecs-scoreboard-2014-broadband-access-improved-challenges-remain/ 
(last visited on 17th June 2014). 
82 Fernández Pérez, M., Net Neutrality: document pool II, 25th April 2015, available at https://edri.org/net-
neutrality-document-pool-2/ (last visited on 10th June 2015). 
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Commission proposed a Telecommunications Single Market Package.83 However, the 
proposal contained a series of loopholes related to net neutrality. On 3rd April 2014, the 
European Parliament adopted a legislative resolution defending net neutrality84.85 
However, Member States have several approaches, expressed within the Council of the 
European Union – the institution which represents the twenty-eight Member States. 
While countries like the Netherlands or Slovenia have passed laws that protect net 
neutrality, most EU countries do not have enough protections against discriminatory 
treatment of traffic.86 On 30th June 2015, the European Parliament, the Council of the 
EU and the European Commission reached an agreement to regulate net neutrality. 
 
Besides the threats against net neutrality worldwide (e.g. in India87 or Mexico88), the 
Vice-President of the Commission, Ansip argued in his hearing before the 
Parliamentary committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) that 
“all the traffic in the Internet has to be treated equally, nobody has [the] right to abuse 
their dominant position in the market or gate keeper’s position.”89 That should be 
guaranteed not only in the EU or China, but in the whole world. 
 
                                                          
83 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying 
down measures concerning the European single market for electronic communications and to achieve a 
Connected Continent, and amending Directives 2002/20/EC, 2002/21/EC, 2002/22/EC, and Regulations 
(EC) No 1211/2009 and (EU) No 531/2012 - COM(2013) 627 final, 11th September 2013, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/connected-continent-single-telecom-market-growth-jobs (last visited 
on 9th June 2015). 
84 European Parliament legislative resolution of 3rd April 2014 on the proposal for a regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council laying down measures concerning the European single market 
for electronic communications and to achieve a Connected Continent, and amending Directives 
2002/20/EC, 2002/21/EC, 2002/22/EC, and Regulations (EC) No 1211/2009 and (EU) No 531/2012 
(COM(2013)0627 – C7-0267/2013 – 2013/0309(COD)), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2014-
0281+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN (last visited on 8th June 2015). 
85 Access and EDRi, Net neutrality – building on success, available at 
https://www.accessnow.org/blog/2015/06/01/net-neutrality-building-on-success (last visited on 8th June 
2015). 
86 See how the ordinary legislative process functions here:  European Parliament, Legislative powers. 
Ordinary legislative powers, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/20150201PVL00004/Legislative-powers (last visited 
on 9th June 2015). 
87 Cf. http://www.netneutrality.in/ (last visited on 10th June 2015). 
88 Ley Federal de Telecomunicaciones y radiodifusión, Mexico, 14 July 2014, available at 
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/ref/lftr/LFTR_orig_14jul14.pdf (last visited on 8th June 2015). 
89 IMCO, Hearing of Andrus Ansip, Vice-President and Commissioner-Designate (Digital Single 
Market), available at 
http://www.elections2014.eu/resources/library/media/20141022RES75838/20141022RES75838.pdf (last 
visited on 10th June 2015). 
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For its part, China has injected a lot of capital into Internet infrastructure construction.90 
However, access to the Internet in China is not equally distributed throughout the 
country. In particular, the western and rural areas are less ‘connected’.91 What is more, 
statistics foresee a reduction in the willingness or capability to use the Internet, showing 
that such absence of motivation derives from the lack of resources, time and knowledge 
about IT matters, Internet unavailability and age.92 Notwithstanding this digital gap, the 
Chinese government seems to be willing to boost the use of the Internet. In fact, it 
considers that “Internet technology lowers the cost of information – of its acquisition, 
storage, indexing, and distribution – to nearly zero”.93  
  
According to a study conducted by the Media Consulting Group for the European 
Parliament, “in spite of its principal role as a regulator, the State is now showing signs 
of becoming more involved in trying to reap financial benefit from China’s Internet 
boom. At the end of 2008, SARFT abruptly declared that all video portals (the most 
profitable sector) had to become State-owned. After some negotiations, portals created 
before the regulation were allowed to remain private, though they are under an 
obligation to get a SARFT-delivered license, while new ones have to become public 
sector operators.” 94 
 
                                                          
90 Belli, L. and De Filippi, P. (Eds.), Op. cit. 
91 Noya, J. (dir.) and others, La imagen de España en China, Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios 
Internacionales y Estratégicos, January 2007, p. 83. 
92 China Internet Network Information Center, Statistical Report on Internet Development in China, 
January 2013, pp. 6, 17 et seq.,   available at 
http://www1.cnnic.cn/IDR/ReportDownloads/201302/P020130312536825920279.pdf (last visited on 25th 
April 2014). However, some have criticised the abovementioned data for being inaccurate. See for 
instance, Bell, I., The Open Debate on Chinese Internet Proliferation, 22 July 2009, 
http://www.ianbell.com/2009/07/22/the-open-debate-on-chinese-Internet-proliferation/ (last visited on 
25th April 2014)  
93 Bambauer, D.E., Consider the Censor, Wake Forest Journal of Law & Policy, Forthcoming; Brooklyn 
Law School, Legal Studies Paper Nº 218, p.4, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1757890 (last visited, 
30th January 2015). 
94 Media Consulting Group, The Potential for Cultural Exchanges between the European Union and 
Third Countries: The Case of China, Study, European Parliament, DG for Internal policies, Policy 
Department B: structural and cohesion policies, April 2009, p. 38, available at  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2009/419097/IPOL-
CULT_ET%282009%29419097_EN.pdf (last visited on 29th January 2015). 
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On the other hand, net neutrality is not respected in China. Internet traffic is not treated 
equally in a non-discriminatory way and restrictions are put in place by the government, 
mainly for political reasons.95 But how does the Internet control in China work? 
 
2. Forms of Internet control in China 
 
Internet control in China can be presented in different ways. According to Arsène96 one 
can classify the Chinese control exercised on the Internet into three levels: through the 
Chinese Great Wall, online intermediaries and self-censorship. 
  
The Chinese Great Firewall 
 
First, connectivity outside China can only be done through official networks. Filtering 
mechanisms prevent access to certain websites. These mechanisms have constituted the 
so-called “Chinese Great Firewall”. Used figuratively in the phrase “Great Firewall of 
China” 97, [it] denotes the extensive Chinese online censorship system”.98 
 
Broadly speaking, this type of measures constitutes a form of ‘censorship’, which, 
according to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) is the “suppression of words, 
images, or ideas that are ‘offensive’”, that “can be carried out by the government as well 
as private pressure groups.” 99  
 
Technically speaking, the Chinese Great Firewall100 refers to “software or hardware that 
controls access to computers for the purpose of network security.” 101 China controls the 
                                                          
95 See for instance, Chinese Computer Information Network and Internet Security, Protection and 
Management Regulations, 30th December 1997, Section Five, available at 
http://fas.org/irp/world/china/netreg.htm (last visited on 21st June 2015). 
96 Arsène, S., The impact of China on global Internet governance in an era of privatized control, Chinese 
Internet Research Conference, May 2012, Los Angeles, United States, pp. 2-4, available at 
https://hal.inria.fr/file/index/docid/704196/filename/circ_14mai.pdf (last visited on 18th June 2015). 
97 Cf. http://www.greatfirewallofchina.org/ (last visited on 31st March 2014) 
98 Hogge, B., A Guide to the Internet for Human Rights Defenders, Barefoot Publishing Limited, 2014, p. 
82 
99 ACLU, What is Censorship?, 30th August 2006, available at https://www.aclu.org/free-speech/what-
censorship (last visited on 18th June 2014) 
100 China devotes particular attention to the US. In fact, it is not difficult to make comparisons between 
the failed international agreement led by the US, ‘ACTA’, with China’s practices. Cf. Masnick, M., The 
Similarity Between ACTA And Chinese Internet Censorship, 20th January 2010, available at 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100120/0216537828.shtml (last visited on 14th June 2014);  By way 
of example, the father of the Great Firewall blames the US for not being as honest and transparent as 
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Internet by keyword filtering; Domain Name System Inspection (DNS Inspection); 
blocking Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and hijacking domain names; restricting 
foreign and politically-sensitive sites; user-identification restraints, such as imposing the 
obligation to submit a Photo ID to the government to create a website102; or by the 
obligation placed over cybercafés to request IDs from its customers103, among others. 
 
Just to mention some examples, keyword filtering is normally used to prevent unwanted 
e-mails or to filter posts in social media. Domain Name System injection is carried out 
by a device (a DNS injector), which is strategically located “inside the network to 
capture DNS requests. Every time the injector sees a DNS request that matches a 
blocked domain, it sends a fake DNS reply containing invalid information”.104 The DNS 
can have vulnerabilities, which can “divert Internet traffic away from legitimate servers 
and towards fake ones.” In other words, a DNS cache can be poisoned if the cache 
information leads to an incorrect entry.105 IP blocking constitutes another form of 
censorship that we need to be aware of,106 which means that IP addresses (regardless of 
how many resources are sharing each blocked address) are rendered inaccessible.    
 
Yet, it has been reported that the majority of the Chinese population does not seem to 
complain about the Great Firewall.107 Maybe this could be explained by the fact that the 
Chinese government has admitted having learnt propaganda strategies from US 
                                                                                                                                                                          
China is with its Internet control policies. Cf. Masnick, M., Father Of The Great Firewall Defends 
Chinese Internet Censorship By Noting The US Does The Same Thing, available at 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110218/01583213162/father-great-firewall-defends-chinese-Internet-
censorship-noting-us-does-same-thing.shtml (last visited on 14th June 2014). That is why in the Press we 
can find analogical references to the Chinese Great Firewall, such as the ‘Great Firewal of America’, used 
by MacKinnon in the New York Times. Cf. MacKinnon, R., Stop the Great Firewall of America, 15th 
November 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/16/opinion/firewall-law-could-infringe-
on-free-speech.html?_r=0 (last visited on 16th June 2014). 
101 Hogge, B., Op. cit. 
102 BBC News, China tightens Internet controls, 23rd February 2010, available at  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8530378.stm (last visited on 15th June 2014). 
103 Abrams, S., China’s Internet Cafes Respond to ID Check Rules, available at 
http://www.chinahearsay.com/china-Internet-cafes-respond-id-check-rules/ (last visited on 15th June 
2014). 
104 Bonaventure, O., DNS injection can pollute the entire Internet, 30th August 2012, available at 
http://perso.uclouvain.be/olivier.bonaventure/blog/html/2012/08/30/dns_injection_can_pollute_the_entire
_internet.html (last visited on 14th June 2014). 
105 See, for instance, http://www.howtogeek.com/161808/htg-explains-what-is-dns-cache-poisoning/ (last 
visited on 18th June 2014). 
106 Connaught Summer Institute, Internet Censorship Lab, 26th July 2013, available at 
http://www.cs.stonybrook.edu/~phillipa/icl_slides.pdf (last visited on 14th June 2014). 
107 Masnick, M., Are People In China Happy With The Great Firewall?, 16th May 2008, 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20080515/0258451120.shtml (last visited on 16th June 2014). 
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politicians and public relations industry from the US.108 This, combined with the 
training Chinese censors and netizens receive, contribute to a distortion of reality, i.e. 
the existence of violations of human rights online.  
 
In order to show how the Chinese Great Firewall works, to monitor blocked URLs and 
to show the level of internet censorship in the country, a group of activists set up 
‘GreatFire.org’.109 However, this project has been subject to pressure and suffers 
cyberattacks.110  
 
In addition to projects like GreatFire.org, there are tools or technologies which allow 
circumventing the Chinese Great Firewall, e.g. by using a virtual private network 
(VPN). As the New York Times reported, “[s]ome foreign companies use Gmail as their 
corporate email service, for example”. Therefore, when being in China, companies 
“have to ensure that employees have V.P.N., or virtual private network, software to get 
into Gmail”, for example.111 According to Google’s own transparency report on traffic, 
some of its products and services are subject to disruptions in China, such as Gmail, 
Google Search, Google sites or Youtube (which is blocked since 2009).112 ‘FireTweet’ 
is another example of alternatives to censorship. ‘Firetweet’ is an application which 
allows you to use Twitter in China, as it is widely blocked.113 
 
On the other hand, experience in other countries demonstrates that China is getting 
ready to conquer the Internet.. Several studies confirm this assertion. According to 
Elcano Global presence 2014 index, China has the fourth biggest presence in the world 
                                                          
108 Masnick, M., China Learned The Tricks of Propaganda From The Best: US Politicians & PR 
Industry, 5th June 2014, https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140604/12125327461/china-learned-tricks-
propaganda-best-us-politicians-pr-industry.shtml (last visited on 15th June 2014) 
109 https://en.greatfire.org/ (last visited on 15th June 2014). 
110 Gilbert, D., Chinese anti-censorship group GreatFire.org hit by aggressive DDoS attack, 23 March 
2015, available at http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/chinese-anti-censorship-group-greatfire-org-hit-by-
aggressive-ddos-attack-1493105 (last visited on 12th April 2015).   
111 New York Times, Gmail is blocked in China after months of disruption,30th December 2014, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/30/technology/gmail-is-blocked-in-china-after-months-of-
disruption.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=second-column-region&region=top-
news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=1 (last visited on 5th January 2015). 
112 Google, Transparency Report on Traffic, 2015, available at 
http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/traffic/disruptions/#region=CN&expand=Y2015 (last visited 
on 5th January 2015). 
113 Fullerton, J., This App Lets China's Netizens Use Twitter Where It's Censored, 9th June 2015, available 
at http://motherboard.vice.com/read/this-app-lets-chinas-netizens-use-twitter-where-its-censored (last 
visited on 9th June 2015). 
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in terms of economic performance, military forces and soft power.114 The Media 
Consulting Group conducted a study for the European Parliament, in which it 
demonstrated that the Internet in China is the “largest in the world and is growing at a 
fast pace”115, together with the mobile sector. The OECD confirmed this assertion.116 
 
At various occasions, the Great Firewall provoked some websites to become 
inaccessible in Chile and in the US due to an alleged “mistake” from China’s side.117 
Indeed, such could happen thanks to DNS cache poisoning, and, particularly IP address 
blocking.118 “Errors” also tend to happen elsewhere. For instance, in the 2014’s 
anniversary of the massacre of Tiananmen Square, LinkedIn censored posts about the 
massacre in Hong Kong “by mistake”, the company said.119 
 
China’s sway is likely to start from the East of Asia. In fact, a recent report of the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies demonstrates that China is going to 
become the most influential power in East Asia in the next decade.120 Pursuant to a 
survey conducted from 24th March to 22nd April 2014, more than half of the 402 non-
governmental experts consulted from 11 countries (Australia, Burma/Myanmar, China, 
India, Indonesia, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and the United 
States of America) estimated that China’s influence will be relevant. By 2030, “China 
alone will probably have the largest economy” on top of the US.121 
 
                                                          
114 Olivié, I., Gracia, M. and García-Calvo, C., Informe Elcano de Presencia global, Real Instituto 
Elcano, 23rd April 2014, available at 
http://www.globalpresence.realinstitutoelcano.org/es/data/Presencia_Global_2014.pdf (last visited on 10th 
January 2015). 
115 Media Consulting Group, Op. cit., pp. 35-39. 
116 OECD, China, Information Technologies and the Internet, OECD Information Technology Outlook 
2006, OECD Publishing, pp. 139-182, available at 10.1787/it_outlook-2006-6-enpp (last visited on 29th 
January 2015). 
117 Masnick, M., DNS Screwup Accidentally Extends Great Firewall Of China To Chile And The US?,26th 
March 2010, available at https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100326/2241128746.shtml (last visited on 
15th June 2014). 
118 http://www.howtogeek.com/161808/htg-explains-what-is-dns-cache-poisoning/ (last visited on 18th 
June 2014). 
119 Guilford, G., LinkedIn is censoring posts about Tiananmen Square,  4th June 2014, available at 
http://qz.com/216691/linkedin-is-censoring-posts-about-tiananmen-square-even-outside-mainland-china/ 
(last visited on 15th June 2014). 
120 Green, M.J. and Szechenyi, N., Power and Order in Asia. A Survey of Regional Expectations, Center 
for Strategic and International Studies, 5th June 2014, available at 
http://csis.org/files/publication/140605_Green_PowerandOrder_WEB.pdf (last visited on 9th June 2014). 
121 NIC, Global Trends 2030: Alternative worlds, US National Intelligence Council, p. III, available at 
http://globaltrends2030.files.wordpress.com/2012/11/global-trends-2030-november2012.pdf (last visited 
on 11th June 2014) 
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Intermediaries in China 
 
The second level of Internet control is exercised by intermediaries. ‘Intermediaries’ is a 
broad term “referring to any company providing services on, or to connect to, the 
Internet.”122 More precisely, the OECD defines them as companies which “give access 
to, host, transmit and index content, products and services, originated by third parties on 
the internet or provide internet-based services to third parties.”  These include Internet 
access and service providers (ISPs), Data protessing and web hosting providers 
(including domain name registars), Internet search engines and portals, E-commerce 
intermediaries or participative networking platforms”123 
 
In China, intermediaries providing a service, such as blog hosting, are liable for the 
content published by Internet users. The law obliges them whether to hire employees to 
conduct content surveillance or to implement automatic filtering systems, failing which 
forums of discussions can be closed.124 Article 15 of the ‘Measures on the 
Administration of Internet Information Services’ 
“stipulate what have come to be known as the ‘nine forbidden content categories’ for 
Chinese online services. These categories include speech that ‘harms the dignity or 
interests of the State’, or ‘disseminates rumours, disturbs social order or disrupts social 
stability’, or ‘Sabotages State religious policy or propagates heretical teachings or 
feudal superstitions’.”125 
 
In this sense, the Chinese’s latest campaign buildss on an initiative called “Cleaning the 
Web 2014”, which is a form of information management, i.e. restricting access to 
information on the grounds of being rumours, pornography, among others.126  
 
Failure to comply with or adapt to Chinese Internet policy obligations may entail 
criminal liability, which can go up to prison,127 financial liability and, in case of an 
                                                          
122 McNamee, J., The Slide From "Self-Regulation" to corporate censorship, EDRi booklet, 25th 
September 2011, available at https://edri.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/01/selfregualation_paper_20110925_web.pdf  (last visited on 29th June 2015).    
123 OECD, The Economic and Social Role of internet Intermediaries, April 2010, p. 9, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/44949023.pdf (last visited on 16th June 2015). 
124 Arsène, S., Protester sur le web chinois (1994-2011), Le Temps des médias, 2012, p. 102, available at 
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00773738/document (last visited on 28th January 2015). 
125 UNESCO, Fostering Freedom Online. The Role of Internet Intermediaries, 19th January 2015, p. 32, 
available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002311/231162e.pdf (last visited on 28th January 
2015). 
126 ECFR, China’s Expanding Cyberspace, June 2014, p. 11, available at http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-
/ChinaAnalysisEng_June2014.pdf  (last visited on 17th June 2014). 
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undertaking, the loss of its business license.128 In fact, Article 20 of the Measures for 
Managing Internet Information Services allows China to have a strict liability regime. 
As a UNESCO study points out,  129 
“[the] Chinese government imposes liability for unlawful content on all intermediaries. 
If they fail to sufficiently monitor user activity, take down content or report violations, 
they may face fines, criminal liability, and revocation of business or media licenses.” 
 
By imposing intermediary liability, search engines like Google would be obliged not to 
show websites in its search results (i.e. to de-index them) if the websites in question 
inter alia contain keywords which may endanger the public interest. Failure to comply 
with such obligation would entail liability, being sanctioned pursuant to the law.  
 
According to the abovementioned UNESCO study, Article 13 of the Chinese Measures 
on the Administration of Internet Information Services stipulates that  
“all ‘information service providers’ [ISPs] are required to ‘ensure that the information 
that they provide is lawful’. A revised ‘deliberation draft’ of the Measures was jointly 
released by the State Information Office and Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology in 2012, proposing a number of updated provisions specifying the 
obligations of ISPs. 
The draft which is expected to become law and which has therefore already begun to 
influence company behaviour, stipulates that once an internet information service 
discovers that the information published falls into the nine forbidden content 
categories’, it shall ‘immediately stop the publication and transmission thereof, save the 
relevant records and make a report thereon to the relevant authority and the public 
security department’ (Articles 18 and 19). Article 25 stipulates the creation of a 
complaints system enabling any member of the public to report illegal content that they 
see on information service providers to the public security bureau and other relevant 
government departments.”130 (emphasis added). 
 
In addition, China adopted a new national security law131 and is expected to adopt a new 
cyber security law132, which will further increase pressure on ISPs companies to keep 
policing online content.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
127 E.g. Hu Jia (“incentivising subversion of state power”, April 2008); Huang Qi (“illegal possession of 
state secrets”, July 2008); Liu Jin (“using heretical organisation to undermine implementation of the law”, 
November 2008). Cf. Reporters Without Borders, available at https://en.rsf.org/ (last visited on 28th 
January 2015). 
128 Anonymous, China and the Internet, Harvard International review, Summer 2009, Vol. 31 Issue 2. 
129 UNESCO, Fostering Freedom…, Op. cit., p. 40. 
130 Ibid., p. 45. 
131 The National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, China adopts national security law, 
Press release, Beijing, 1st July 2015, available at 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/news/Legislation/2015-07/01/content_1940329.htm (last visited on 5th 
August 2015).  
132 The National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, China Seeks public views on new 
cyber security law, Press release, Beijing, 8th July 2015, available at 
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Self-censorship 
 
The third level of Internet control in China is self-censorship.  
 
We live in an era in which self-censorship is a reality. Both the industry and individuals 
self-regulate and self-censor either because the law imposes this, or because they 
“voluntarily” want to do so or because there is a lack of trust in the digital environment. 
This does not solely happen in China, but around the world as well. 
 
Since 1996, Internet users in China had to register with the local police to be able to 
have Internet subscription. According to Arsène, that does not seem applicable 
nowadays. Nevertheless, since 2009, Chinese Internet users have to identify themselves 
with the corresponding Internet service provider to open an account so as to benefit 
from the service in question. This is called the ‘real names system’, which is also 
imposed in hotels, cybercafés or which is required for opening a blog or a microblog.133  
 
Fortunately for anonymity and the right to privacy, the enforcement of these restrictive 
measures does not seem to be perfect, since much of the information provided is not 
thoughtfully verified. However, the “Regulation on the Management of Internet User 
Accounts”, which was enacted by China’s State Internet Information Office on 4th 
February 2015 and entered into force on 1st March 2015,134 reinforces the ‘real names 
system’. It strengthens the enforcement of this system by vesting the Cyberspace 
Administration of China with supervision powers.135 Privatised enforcement is also 
encouraged. When the information provided by the user or its/her/his account name is 
false, harmful, unlawful or fraudulent, “Internet information providers” are required to 
punish the Internet user, punishment which can go up to the elimination of the account 
                                                                                                                                                                          
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/news/2015-07/10/content_1941413.htm (last visited on 5th August 
2015). 
133 Arsène, S., The impact of China…, Op. cit., pp. 2-4. 
134 Unofficial translation made by China Copyright and Media, China’s State Internet Information Office: 
Regulation on the Management of Internet User Accounts, 4th February 2015, available at 
https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2015/02/04/internet-user-account-name-management-
regulations/ ; Chinese version available at http://www.cac.gov.cn/2015-02/04/c_1114246561.htm (last 
visited on 22nd June 2015). 
135 Ibid, Article 3. 
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and to reporting the situation to the “Internet information content controlling 
department”.136 
 
Furthermore, Internet users are being told by government-related sources that they are 
subject to surveillance and are encouraged self-censor.137 Anonymity is no longer 
guaranteed on the Chinese Internet.138 In the words of Arsène, many Chinese online 
users “lack self-confidence when it comes to writing their opinions online.” Website 
“moderators have the power to delete messages and they often do so”139 – to the 
detriment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.  
 
Self-censorship in China can be presented in other forms, such as ‘prepublication 
censorship’, which consists of blocking key words and putting in place police cartoons 
so as to warn users about online content infringements; ‘post-publication censorship’, 
which refers to the elimination of blog entries or search engine results; use of 
sophisticated hacking and cyber-espionage activities; or recourse to manipulation by 
means of the so-called ’50 Cent Party’, purportedly composed of 250,000 people, who 
disseminate favourable ideas about the government and monitor Internet policy 
compliance.140  
 
In this sense, fundamental rights and freedoms are difficult to defend in China, even 
when users try to use circumvention tools. China is keeping up with new technologies to 
the point it has been able to interrupt encrypted communications that use a virtual 
private network (VPN) connection.141  
 
What is more, the Chinese government is using education as a means to teach 
individuals about how to “properly” use the Internet. The already-mentioned Chinese 
White Paper regarding the Internet further specifies that “[t]he state proactively 
                                                          
136 Ibid, Articles 7 and 8. 
137 Arsène, S., Protester…, Op.cit, p. 103. 
138 Unless Internet users circumvent Internet control mechanisms, which are increasingly harder to use 
effectively due to the power of the technology used by the Chinese government. 
139 Arsène, S., Online discussions in China. China Perspectives, French Center for Research on 
Contemporary China, 2008, p.11, available at https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00773584/document 
(last visited on 14th December 2014). 
140 Anonymous, China and the Internet, Op. cit., pp. 71 et seq. 
141 The Guardian, China tightens 'Great Firewall' Internet control with new technology, 14th December 
2012, available at http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/dec/14/china-tightens-great-firewall-
Internet-control (last visited on 14th June 2014). 
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promotes industry self-regulation and public supervision.”142 In fact, the government 
has launched a code of conduct for the Internet and “Seven Self-Censorship 
Guidelines”, which have already “punished” a considerable number of netizens.143 
China has issued more precise guidelines for celebrities  to help them conduct self-
censorship144 and also conducts general trainings on censorship.145 Additionally, the 
Internet Society of China (ISC), a national organisation created in 2001 with the view to 
“serv[e] the development of that industry, netizens, and the decisions of the 
government”, has already issued various sets of self-regulatory recommendations and 
pledges.146 Put simply, Chinese people are being taught how to limit expressions of 
what they think, how to act and react. The Chinese population do not generally have a 
notion of the level of Internet control in their country.  
 
In sum,  China does not count with a global Internet, but with a shaped (restricted) 
“Chinanet”.147 In line with China’s position, Herold considers that the Internet is 
transforming into an inter-connected national intranets in which China is setting the 
‘rules of the game’. For Herold, China did not have to control the Internet because 
everything was state-owned when the Internet was created. On the contrary, the Chinese 
government had to “explicitly or implicitly allow everything that happens [offline] in 
[the] Chinese cyberspace.” 148 In his words, 
“[t]he Internet used to be a wild, unregulated, border-less place for pioneers and 
individualists. This began to change as Civilisation arrived to protect the weak and 
facilitate the exploitation of economic resources. Robber-barons of the Internet arose 
(e.g. Google) who are still wielding a lot of power (2011), but their era will soon end, as 
civilisation expands and the state gets ready to challenge their powers. The wilderness is 
settled and made habitable for all through infrastructure improvements and the 
elimination of dangers. 'Settled areas' are created (Facebook, Twitter, 'Apps') and 'the 
                                                          
142 Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Op. Cit. 
143 Global Voices Advocacy, China: Over 100,000 Weibo Users Punished for Violating ‘Censorship 
Guidelines’, 13th November 2013, available at http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2013/11/13/china-
over-100000-weibo-users-punished-for-violating-censorship-guidelines/ (last visited on 14th June 2014) 
144 Global Voices, China Gives Internet Celebrities a Guide for Self-Censorship, 13th August 2013, 
available at http://globalvoicesonline.org/2013/08/13/china-creates-guideline-for-Internet-celebrities-self-
censorship/  (last visited on 14th June 2014).. 
145 Sloan, A., China ramps up army of “opinion monitors”, 25th March 2014, available at 
http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2014/03/china-opinion-monitors/ (last visited on 15th June 2014). 
146 Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Op. Cit. 
147 ECFR, China 3.0, November 2012, p. 101, available at http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-
/ECFR66_CHINA_30_final.pdf  (last visited on 17th June 2014). 
148 Herold, D.H., An Inter-nation-al Internet: China’s contribution to global Internet governance?, 5th 
September 2011, pp. 4 and 5, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1922725 (last visited on 24th April 
2014). 
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law' has arrived to watch over the now settled territories ready to join 'the Union' 
(offline world).”149 
 
Herold predicts countries will follow the Chinese model. If so, instead of having access 
to a “global” Internet, we will live in an “inter-nation-al Internet”.150 “From the United 
States to the European Union to the Middle East to Africa and Asia, governments have 
articulated different rationalisations and implemented varying strategies for controlling 
the Internet”.151 The Internet is part of what Shapiro called the “Control Revolution”.152 
In the next section, we demonstrate EU countries also employ forms of Internet control 
which are sometimes similar to those of China. 
 
3. Forms of Internet control in EU countries 
 
In this section, we analyse the level of Internet control measures in the European Union 
following the same classification as in the previous section. 153 Broadly speaking, 
Internet control measures can also be implemented through censorship mechanisms, 
intermediaries’ interventions and self-censorship. However, there are other types of 
Internet control measures which would not fit this classification, but that still 
compromise citizens’ conduct towards the Internet. An example of Internet control 
measures implemented within the EU154  is the Spanish Citizens’ Security law. On 29th 
November 2013, the Spanish government proposed a draft law on the Protection of 
Citizens’ Security, which was intended to substitute an existing law from 1992. On 11th 
July 2014, the Spanish Council of Ministers adopted the Citizens' Security Bill, 
                                                          
149 Ibid., p. 9. 
150 Ibid., p. 14. 
151 Tai, Z., The Internet in China: Cyberspace and Civil Society, Ed. Routledge, New York, 2006, p. 85  
152 Shapiro, A., The Control Revolution: How the Internet is Putting Individuals in Charge and Changing 
the World. Public Affairs, New York, 1999. 
153 Arsène, S., The impact of China…, Op. Cit. 
154 We could mention more examples, such as the comparison between the Google China case and UK 
Digital Economy Bill. Cf. MacKinnon, R., Google and Internet Control in China. Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 24th March 2010, available at 
http://rconversation.blogs.com/MacKinnonCECC_Mar24.pdf; Marks, K., The BPI's China-like clauses in 
the Digital Economy Bill, 23rd March 2010, available at http://epeus.blogspot.be/2010/03/bpis-china-like-
clauses-in-digital.html; or Masnick, M., China Gleefully Uses UK Desire For Censorship To Validate Its 
Own Censorship, 12th April 2011, available at 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110812/10553415491/china-gleefully-uses-uk-desire-censorship-to-
validate-its-own-censorship.shtml (last visited on 15th June 2014). 
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“hearing” the opinions of several public authorities and civil society.155 After being 
reviewed by the two Parliamentary chambers, the law was adopted on 30th March 
2015156 and entered into force on 1st July 2015.157   
 
The Spanish Citizens’ Security Law poses several threats to fundamental rights and 
freedoms,158 having similarities with some Chinese provisions,159 to the point that after 
its adoption, this law was sent to the Spanish Constitutional Court by almost all political 
parties of the opposition160 and has been subject to international and national outcry.161 
 
As mentioned elsewhere,162 Article 25 of the Spanish Citizens’ Security Law may 
infringe EU data protection and privacy legislation163 because it would inter alia require 
cybercafés and related establishments to scan and keep record of their clients' IDs in 
order for the clients to have access to their services. Failure to do so leads to pecuniary 
sanctions ranging from 100 to 30,000 Euros.164 
 
                                                          
155 Spanish Minister of Interior, Aprobado el Proyecto de Ley Orgánica de Protección de la Seguridad 
Ciudadana, Press conference, available at http://www.interior.gob.es/web/interior/prensa/noticias/-
/asset_publisher/GHU8Ap6ztgsg/content/id/2230243 (last visited on 17th July 2014). 
156 Ley Orgánica 4/2015, de 30 de marzo, de protección de la seguridad ciudadana, Spain, available at 
http://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2015-3442 (last visited on 28th June 2015). 
157 ElMundo, Las 44 conductas que se multan en la nueva 'ley mordaza', 1st July 2015, available at 
http://www.elmundo.es/espana/2015/07/01/559418d5268e3eb16d8b4582.html (last visited on 2nd July 
2015). 
158 See, for instance, Rights International Spain and others, Análisis   de   la   Ley   Orgánica   4/2015,   de   
30   de   marzo,   de  Protección de la Seguridad Ciudadana a los efectos de la posible  vulneración de los 
artículos 1, 9.2,  10.1, 14, 15, 20, 21, 24 y 25  de la Constitución Española,  available at 
http://rightsinternationalspain.org/uploads/publicacion/3d3d492cacc2a6705ccec427f61dd51b86c0f94b.pd
f (last visited on 8th June 2015). 
159 Fernández Pérez, M., Spanish Citizens’ Security Bill: Many restrictions, few freedoms, 28 th January 
2015, available at https://edri.org/spanish-citizens-security-bill-many-restrictions-few-freedoms/ (last 
visited on 28th January 2015). 
160 Namely, PSOE, la Izquierda Plural, UPyD, Coalición Canaria and Compromís-Equo. The appeal was 
sent on 21st May 2015. See, for instance, RTVE, La oposición recurre ante el Tribunal Constitucional la 
ley de seguridad ciudadana, 21st May 2015, available at http://www.rtve.es/noticias/20150521/oposicion-
recurre-ante-tribunal-constitucional-ley-seguridad-ciudadana/1148155.shtml (last visited on 28th June 
2015). 
161 Fernández Pérez, M., Spanish Citizens…Op. cit. 
162 Fernández Pérez, M., Spain: Why you should care about the Citizens’ Security Bill, 30th July 2014, 
available at https://edri.org/spain-citizens-security-bill/ (last visited on 3rd November 2014) 
163 Article 36(26) of the Spanish law 4/2015, on the Protection of Citizens’ Security is another example of 
a restriction to data protection. See, for instance, Rights International Spain and others, Op. cit., p. 33.   
164 Fernández Pérez, M. and Massé, E., Spanish Citizens’ Security Bill: Many restrictions, few freedoms, 
28th January 2015, available at https://edri.org/spanish-citizens-security-bill-many-restrictions-few-
freedoms/ (last visited on 12th April 2015). 
  Maryant Nathalie Fernández Pérez 
                 
 
 37 
Internet Control: assessing China in a comparative European context 
Spain is not the only country with such a measure. France also contains an obligation 
for cybercafés to retain personal data which could identify their users.165 As noted by 
scholar Abrams, this measure was implemented in China a few years ago166 with 
significant business losses and other countries also unsuccessfully tried to implement 
such measure. In Chile, its Parliament tried to impose registration of cybercafé users, 
but the Constitutional Court of Chile declared the proposal unconstitutional.167  
 
Following this introduction and EU-related example, in this section we take the same 
approach as in the previous section (related to China) to easily demonstrate that EU 
countries also conduct Internet control measures which are detrimental to Internet users’ 




The EU and its Member States are not exempt from being compared to China in terms 
of censorship.168 Following Cox, “authoritarian governments who are aggressively 
blocking and censoring the Internet” are not the greatest danger to “the most powerful 
engine for […] the free exchange of ideas ever invented”, but democratic 
governments.169 Masnick expresses the same degree of concern: 
“The slippery slope to censorship starts with the insistence that the mechanism for 
censorship only has "the best intentions." But the reality is that once you have the 
infrastructure for censorship, it's only a matter of time until that censorship expands. It's 
just too powerful for those in control.“ 170 
 
                                                          
165 Article L34-1 of the “Code des postes et des communications électroniques français”, available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070987 (last visited on 12th 
April 2015). 
166 Abrams, S., Op. cit. 
167 Constitutional Court of Chile, Court ruling of 12th July 2011, available at 
http://www.tribunalconstitucional.cl/wp/ver.php?id=2011 (last visited on 28th January 2015). 
168 McNamee, J., EU and China adopt harmonised approach to censorship, 18th May 2011, available at 
http://edri.org/edrigramnumber9-10eu-china-censorship-Internet/; and Masnick, M., EU Parliament 
Wants China To Join ACTA, Even As It May Reject It?, 25th May 2012, available at 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120524/03204119058/eu-parliament-wants-china-to-join-acta-even-
as-it-may-reject-it.shtml (last visited on 16th June 2014).  
169 Cox, C., Establishing Global Internet Freedom: Tear Down this Firewall, In Thierer, A. and Crews, 
C.W. (Eds.), Who rules the net? Internet governance and jurisdiction, Washington D.C., The Cato 
Institute, 2003, pp. 3-11; Cf. Herold, D.H., Op. cit, p. 11. 
170 Masnick, M., Chinese Lessons For SOPA/PIPA: The Great Firewall Of China Was Once A Way To 
Stop Infringement Too, 23rd January 2012, available at 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120119/17271917481/chinese-lessons-sopapipa-great-firewall-china-
was-once-way-to-stop-infringement-too.shtml (last visited on 15th June 2014) 
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China often argues the Great Firewall is not about censorship, but about protecting 
public interests.171 Yet, the same argument is used by Occidental regulators when 
imposing restrictions to human rights online. By following the same reasoning as in 
Western countries, China transforms public policy objectives as a justification to censor, 
intimidate, restrict access or, more generally, to impose online control mechanisms. For 
instance, China has used this excuse comparing itself to Germany, Turkey, the US or 
with companies like Facebook172 or Google.173  
 
The main difference, however, is that in China Internet users have been educated not to 
have access to the global Internet and do not usually see violations of their human rights 
or fundamental freedoms as a threat. Conversely, Internet users living in democratic 
countries have a different background. The Internet is open by nature. However, when 
Internet access is limited, citizens’ rights and freedoms become less enforceable.174 As 
the Council of Europe recommended, “[t]he freedom, dignity and privacy of Internet 
users must be a central concern and priority for democracies, especially governments 
which rely upon and encourage the use of new technologies”.175 The current challenge 
for democratic governments and companies is to regain citizens’ trust. The risk of 
regaining Internet users’ trust is that governments and companies use it as the basis for 
having more control over the Internet. 
 
This control in democratic countries like EU Member states can be presented in the 
form of censorship, which adopts different forms. In order to demonstrate censorship 
exists in EU countries, we provide three examples: media restrictions, content 
moderation and blocking. 
 
                                                          
171 Masnick, M., China: Great Firewall isn’t censorship, it’s safeguarding the public, 21st October 2011, 
available at https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20111020/03291216428/china-great-firewall-isnt-
censorship-its-safeguarding-public.shtml (last visited on 15th June 2014). 
172 Eg. Global Times, Web regulation in public's best interest, 4th June 2013, 
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/786493.shtml (last visited on 14th June 2014); 
173 Masnick, M., That's Rich: China Accuses Google Of Censorship, 28th October 2009, available at 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20091027/1754316700.shtml (last visited on 15th June 2014). 
174 Kulesza, J., Protecting Human Rights Online -- An Obligation of Due Diligence, Jean Monnet 
Working Paper 24/14, 2014, p. 11, available at 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/14/documents/JMWP24Kulesza.pdf (last visited on 5th 
January 2015). Although the author refers to freedom of expression, we are of the opinion that the same 
applies to all fundamental rights and freedoms. 
175 Council of Europe, Internet Governance Strategy 2012-2015, available at 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1919461 (last visited on 2nd January 2015). 
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First, there have been cases registered for restricting freedom of the media online. For 
instance, the civil society organisations Index on Censorship and Osservatorio Balcani 
e Caucaso are working on a project to map freedom of the media violations in Europe. 
176 At the time of writing, the project has identified over 550 violations in the European 
Union.177 Freedom of expression is being threatened with intermediary liability 
especially on social media. For instance, after a Spanish politician passed away in May 
2014, several entries in social media were taken down, leading censorship in social 
media that was not always proportionate or necessary as some Internet users have faced 
penalties up to imprisonment.178 
 
Second, as Arsène argues, while the role of Chinese ‘website moderators’ “is often 
described as crude censorship by Western Internet observers”[, they] tend to forget that 
this function is also crucial on the Western Web platforms”.179 
 
Third, blocking represents another form of censorship which is not always 
proportionate, necessary or efficient. Whereas in repressive states blocking access to the 
Internet does not surprise many people, western countries are rapidly and dangerously 
increasing blocking content which is deemed harmful or inappropriate. This system 
presents at least five flaws. First, blocking can wrongly prevent access to lawful content 
or permit access to unlawful content. Second, blocking systems like in the UK are 
possible thanks to lists of targeted websites which are “opaque at best [and] secret at 
worst”.180 Third, the concept of legality is not the same in all countries, which makes it 
difficult to assess the nature of the content and the appropriate action to take. Fourth, 
effective remedies often represent a burden are widely unknown or do not even exist. 
Fifth, blocking is not very difficult to circumvent from a technical point of view. In this 
sense, those Internet users willing to have access to unlawful material are decreasingly 
                                                          
176 Similarly, the civil society organisation Reporters without borders issues a worldwide report assessing 
the freedom enjoyed by journalists, the media and netizens on a yearly basis. The study takes into account 
the actions of the governments in order to protect freedom of expression and, in particular, the freedom of 
the press in its broad sense. Cf. Tout l’Europe, La liberté de la presse en Europe, 15th January 2015, 
available at http://www.touteleurope.eu/actualite/la-liberte-de-la-presse-en-europe.html (last visited on 
16th January 2015).  
177 For more information, see http://mediafreedom.ushahidi.com/ (last visited on 15th January 2015). 
178 Fernández Pérez, M., Spain: social media to be censored? “Not everything is appropriate”, 21st May 
2014, http://edri.org/spain-social-media-to-be-censored-not-everything-is-appropriate/ (last visited on 19th 
June 2014). 
179 Arsène, S., Online discussions in China…, Op. cit.,p. 11. 
180 Commissioner for Human Rights, The rule of law…, Op. cit., pp. 66 and 67. 
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using websites and rather use “peer-to-peer networks, chat rooms, encrypted web 
spaces, image hosting sites or hacked sites”.181 Blocking becomes more dangerous when 
intermediaries are encouraged to take action.182 
 
The role of intermediaries 
 
The rule of law is greater challenged when EU countries ask intermediaries to take 
“voluntary” measures in order to attain public interests, such as protecting children 
online, countering terrorism or fighting against hate speech.183 In pursuing these 
objectives, however, companies become gatekeepers in policing content online. As 
already stated elsewhere, there is a consistent problem in the European Union when 
restrictions are imposed in a “voluntary” way by corporations in the absence of a legal 
obligation. In fact, “there is a broad lack of clarity as regards the extent to which the 
negative obligations of states are invoked when they encourage private companies to 
impose restrictions. Similarly, there is a lack of clarity as to the state's positive 
obligations to react in cases where there are restrictions imposed with or without state 
involvement.”184 These practices are commonly known as “self-regulation”. 
 
The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), which is one of the EU 
institutions,185 defined this practice. According to the EESC, “self-regulation has its 
origins in behavioural psychology. When applied to the economic sphere, it broadly 
denotes the adoption by economic operators of certain rules of conduct among 
themselves or in relation to third parties in the market and in society, adherence to 
which is agreed among themselves, without any external coercive mechanisms” 
(emphasis added). Nonetheless, as the EESC itself recognises, self-regulatory practices 
are not always “spontaneous”. They can be imposed as long as they serve as a 
complement to hard law. However, this safeguard can be bypassed if there is a legal 
basis for these “voluntary” measures. The big loophole in the EU legal framework, as 
the EESC notes, is that “neither the EU treaties nor Member States’ constitutions 
                                                          
181 Commissioner for Human Rights, The rule of law…, Op. cit., pp. 66-68. 
182 Ibid, p. 70.  
183 Ibid, p. 66. 
184 McNamee, J. and Fernández Pérez, M. (Eds.), Human Rights Violations Online, drafted by European 
Digital Rights for the Council of Europe, DGI(2014)31, 4th December 2014, p. 25, available at 
https://edri.org/files/EDRI_CoE.pdf (last visited on 30th January 2015). 
185 To know more about the EU institutions, bodies and agencies, see http://europa.eu/about-
eu/institutions-bodies/ (last visited on 2nd July 2015). 
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provide any such enabling basis”. The European Commission confirmed that in their 
2002 Action plan: “unlike co-regulation, self-regulation does not involve a legislative 
act".186 
 
“[W]hat is still lacking187 is a political-legislative discussion to clearly define the legal 
framework that should govern the operation of these instruments at EU level. This 
should specify their legal nature, lay down conditions for their validity, define their 
areas of application, clarify links with hard law, and set down their limits in a 
consistent, coherent and harmonised framework”, the EESC Opinion added.188 Without 
a clear, legally binding and enforceable legal framework, there will always be a risk of 
arbitrary behaviour or over-implementation of “voluntary” agreements by 
intermediaries, sometimes bypassing the rule of law. For instance, some companies like 
Microsoft state in their terms of service or “code of conduct that they reserve “the right, 
at its sole discretion, and without any obligation to do so, to review and remove user-
created services and content at will and without notice, and delete content and accounts” 
(emphasis added). 189  
 
Filtering and blocking content online are two examples of these encouraged “self-
regulatory” measures taken by intermediaries, encouraged by EU governments. 
 
In fact, some EU countries have or are proposing measures (whether legislative or not) 
for ISPs to be in charge of taking down or blocking websites whose content could 
purportedly incite terrorism, for example. However, such classification does not count 
with judicial review, i.e. no judge verifies the content incites terrorism or not which, 
indirectly, risks creating a degree of impunity for offenders, who no longer need to 
reckon with having a real investigation of their activities.  
                                                          
186 European Commission, Action Plan "Simplifying and improving the regulatory 
environment", Communication from the Commission, COM(2002) 278 final – Not published in 
the Official Journal, 5th June 2002, p.11, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=URISERV:l10108&from=EN (last visited on 2nd July 2015). Cf. 
EESC, Opinion on Self-regulation and co-regulation in the Community legislative framework, 
INT/754, 22nd April 2015, available at http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.int-
opinions.32859 (last visited on 28th June 2015). 
187 The EESC Opinion dates of 28th April 2015. At the time of writing, such political and/or legal 
discussion has not taken place yet. 
188 EESC, Op. cit. 
189 Microsoft, Code of conduct, updated in April 2009, available at http://windows.microsoft.com/en-
us/windows-live/code-of-conduct (last visited on 2nd July 2015). 
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In the view of the Commissioner for Human Rights for the Council of Europe, these 
practices represent “a problematic proposition which, along with other filtering 
measures, could be used to silence undesired voices."190 These are the practices one 
finds in France or the UK, for instance.  
 
On 4th March 2015, the French government adopted a decree aimed at further 
countering terrorism online and its incitement as well as fighting against child 
pornography.191 This decree was enacted to complement the French law enacted in 2014 
to strengthen the fight against terrorism.192 Both pieces of legislation reformed the law 
on trust in the digital economy (the so-called “LCEN”).193 According to Article 6-1 of 
the LCEN, the French Ministry of Interior has the power to order to blocking certain 
websites that may inter alia incite terrorism. For that, the Ministry needs to warn the 
hosting company before asking internet access providers to block the allegedly 
problematic websites. 
 
Between the middle and the end of March 2015, the Ministry of Interior ordered 
Internet access providers to block five websites in France.194 In this case, the companies 
hosting those websites were not notified of the blocking order, contrary to the 
provisions of the law. This was allegedly due to the fact that the hosting companies 
were located abroad.195 According to the LCEN, the Minister of Interior has to ask the 
                                                          
190 Commissioner for Human Rights, Positions on counter-terrorism and human rights protection, 
CommDH/PositionPaper(2015)1, Council of Europe, p. 7, available at 
https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=2
757196&SecMode=1&DocId=2274090&Usage=2 (last visited on 16th June 2015). 
191 Décret [français] n° 2015-253 du 4 mars 2015 relatif au déréférencement des sites provoquant à des 
actes de terrorisme ou en faisant l'apologie et des sites diffusant des images et représentations de mineurs 
à caractère pornographique, available at 
http://legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid=?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000030313562&dateTexte=&o
ldAction=dernierJO&categorieLien=id (last visited on 2nd July 2015). 
192  Loi [française] n° 2014-1353 du 13 novembre 2014 renforçant les dispositions relatives à la lutte 
contre le terrorisme, available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid=734BDF263C832C9D3D0CD91191F5F5C8.tpd
ila24v_2?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000029754374&dateTexte=29990101 (last visited on 4th July 2015). 
193 Loi [française] n° 2004-575 du 21 juin 2004 pour la confiance dans l'économie numérique, available at 
http://legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid=2509631E5AE8978FD31614987761D29B.tpdila23v_
1?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000801164&dateTexte=20150629 (last visited on 2nd July 2015).  
194 BBC News, French government orders website block, 26th March 2015, available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-31904542 (last visited on 26th April 2015). 
195 L’OBS, Cinq sites "faisant l'apologie du terrorisme" bloqués pour la première fois en France, 16th 
March 2015, available at http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/societe/20150316.AFP1833/cinq-sites-internet-
bloques-pour-apologie-du-terrorisme-une-premiere-en-france.html (last visited on 26th April 2015). This 
was confirmed by the owner of one of the affected websites, www.islamic-news.info. Cf. Greenwald, G., 
What's scarier: terrorism, or governments blocking websites in its name?, The Intercept, 17th March 
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website owner to “voluntarily” remove the offensive content, failing which the Minister 
of Interior asks the Internet service providers to block the websites in question. 196 
 
As Greenwald puts it, “[i]sn’t the exercise of this website-blocking power what has long 
been cited as reasons we should regard the Bad Countries — such as China and Iran — 
as tyrannies (which also usually cite “counterterrorism” to justify their censorship 
efforts)?”197 
 
The system described in France is a law-based system, but there are EU systems which 
do not have a law-based, predictable (even to the limited extent that the French system 
is) legal framework, as they are “voluntary” or “self-regulatory” agreements between 
the government and Internet Service Providers to take action to protect children (e.g. 
child pornography) or to fight against hate speech, for example. This is the case of the 
UK, for instance.  
 
The British civil society organisation Open Rights Group launched a project to 
document the impact of “parental control” filters in the UK and help people and 
companies which have experienced censorship in the UK due to the filtering system to 
unblock websites. Thanks to this project, “Web users can use a free checking tool on 
www.blocked.org.uk where they can instantly check to see if a website has been 
blocked by filters.” 198 At the time of writing, Open Rights Group has tested over 
2,280,290 sites already. Among the 100,000 top sites rated by the Consultancy firm 
Alexa,199 over 20,000 are blocked by strict filters and over 11,000 are blocked by 
default filters by at least one ISP.200 Why would some of the top-visited websites be 
blocked by ISPs? 
 
The practices described above go against the recommendations given by the former UN 
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, Frank La Rue, i.e.: 
                                                                                                                                                                          
2015, available at https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/03/17/whats-scarier-terrorism-governments-
unilaterally-blocking-websites-name/ (last visited on 26th April 2015). 
196  Greenwald, G., Op. cit. 
197  Ibid. 
198 Open Rights Group, ORG's Blocked project finds almost 1 in 5 sites are blocked by filters, available at 
https://www.openrightsgroup.org/press/releases/orgs-blocked-project-finds-almost-1-in-5-sites-are-
blocked-by-filters (last visited on 14th May 2015). 
199 Cf. http://www.alexa.com (last visited on 4th July 2015). 
200 Cf. https://www.blocked.org.uk/ (last visited on 4th July 2015).  
  Maryant Nathalie Fernández Pérez 
                 
 
 44 
Internet Control: assessing China in a comparative European context 
“Censorship measures should never be delegated to a private entity, and [...] no 
one should be held liable for content on the internet of which they are not the 
author. Indeed, no State should use or force intermediaries to undertake 
censorship on its behalf.”201 
 
What is more, the Special Rapporteur further recommended intermediaries to “only 
implement restrictions to these rights after judicial intervention” (emphasis added) 202 In 
other words, both France and the UK have not followed his recommendations. In this 
sense, the 2015 Latvian Presidency of the Council of the European Union officially 
recognised that self-regulatory measures to block or discriminate on content may raise 
legal concerns vis-à-vis the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the e-Privacy Directive, 




Following the classification outlined when examining forms of self-censorship in China 
and, for the purposes of this paper, we classify self-censorship practices into two types, 
namely ‘pre-publication censorship’ and ‘post-publication censorship’.  
 
Both means of self-censorship are not only conducted by Internet users, but also by 
companies. While pre-publication censorship is caused by restrictions to the right to 
privacy, post-publication censorship is mainly due to freedom of expression restrictions 
online. In order to exemplify the threats to the right to privacy and freedom of 
expression that self-censorship cause in the European Union, we mention the so-called 
‘Delfi case’, which was brought before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
by the company Delfi against Estonia204.  
                                                          
201 UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, Report, 16th May 2011, A/HRC/17/27, para. 43, available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf (last visited on 4th 
July 2015). 
202 Ibid, para. 47. 
203 Latvian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council laying down measures concerning the European single market for 
electronic communications and to achieve a Connected Continent, and amending Directives 2002/20/EC, 
2002/21/EC and 2002/22/EC and Regulations (EC) No 1211/2009 and (EU) No 531/2012 - Examination 
of the Presidency compromise text on net neutrality, 1 3555/13 TELECOM 232 COMPET  
646 MI 753 CONSOM 161 CODEC 2000, 20th January 2015, p.3, available at 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5439-2015-INIT/en/pdf (last visited on 9th July 2015). 
204 ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Delfi AS v. Estonia, Application No. 64569/09, 16th June 2015, available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-155105#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-
155105%22]} (last visited on 14th July 2015). 
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Delfi is a major Internet news portal in Estonia which allows posting comments below 
the articles it publishes. In order to prevent unacceptable behaviour by Internet users, 
Delfi had put three mechanisms in place. First, an automatic filtering system which 
automatically deletes comments with obscene words (i.e. a pre-publication self-
censorship tool). Second, a notice-and-take-down system by means of which any 
Internet user could notify Delfi of hate speech, insulting or mocking comments and 
Delfi would “expeditiously” remove the comments in question (i.e. a post-publication 
self-censorship tool). Third, a removal mechanism under which any victim of 
defamation could notify Delfi of a defamatory comment so Delfi could delete it 
immediately (i.e. a pre-publication self-censorship tool).205 
 
Internet users were able to comment on the articles without being registered.206 In other 
words, Delfi decided not to impose a real name policy for commenters, therefore 
preserving users’ anonymity and privacy online. 
 
In January 2006, one of the articles Delfi published was widely commented. Some of 
the comments, however, were of a defamatory nature. The defamation victim notified 
Delfi six weeks after the publication of the article of the comments and asked for 
damages. Delfi removed the comments on the same day, but refused to pay the damages 
claimed. 207 
 
The victim of the defamatory comments sued Delfi before the Estonian courts. After 
going through different instances, the Estonian Supreme Court ruled against Delfi. 208 
Despite Article 15 of the E-commerce Directive, Estonia's Supreme Court ruled Delfi 
had to monitor and censor unlawful content prior to its publication.209 As stated 
elsewhere, “[t]he Supreme Court of Estonia found that safe harbours set in the e-
Commerce Directive did not apply to Delfi, as the hoster of the comments. It based its 
argumentation on para. 42 of the Preamble of the e-Commerce Directive that indicates 
that the safe harbour exceptions [only] cover cases where the activity of the 
                                                          
205 Ibid, paras. 11-13. 
206 Ibid, para. 12. 
207 Ibid, paras. 16-19.  
208 Supreme Court of Estonia, Vjatšeslav Leedo v. AS Delfi, 3-2-1-43-09, 10th  June 2009, para. 13. 
209 McNamee, J. and Fernández Pérez, M. (Eds.), Human Rights Violations Online…, Op. cit., p.9. 
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intermediary is limited to the technical process of operating and giving access to a 
communication network.” 210 
 
In December 2009, after exhausting the national remedies available, Delfi’s lawyers 
challenged this case before the ECtHR for violation of Delfi’s right to freedom of 
expression, which is embedded in Article 10 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights. On 10th October 2013, the ECtHR found211  the restrictions to Delfi’s freedom 
of expression were proportionate. Additionally, the ECtHR found that Delfi’s pre-
publication and post-publication self-censorship tools were not sufficient to ensure 
third-party personality rights were respected, “taking into consideration the economic 
interest deriving from the number of comments and the technical capacity of the 
ISP.”212 The case was referred to the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR, which confirmed 
the finding. The Court received numerous amici curiae from civil society organisations 
and industry organisations, in favour of Delfi. Nevertheless, the Court remained firm 
and concluded no breach of Delfi’s freedom of expression had taken place.  
 
In line with the E-commerce Directive,213 Delfi can be considered as an Internet hosting 
service provider in the EU. 214 According to its Article 14, hosting service providers  can 
be held liable for third party content if they become aware of illegal activities or 
information hosted by them and do not act “expeditiously” to remove or prevent access 
to the controversial activity or information. Article 15 of the e-commerce Directive 
prohibits Member States from imposing a general monitoring obligation on ISPs. With 
these safe harbour provisions, hosting providers only have two legal incentives, i.e. 
avoiding liability and eventual damages. However, no counterbalancing incentive to 
respect human rights online is placed on hosting providers (or other ISPs). The risk of 
over-censoring or -monitoring is only counteracted by a customer service policy or 
good public relations for defending freedom of expression.215 This risk is evidenced in 
                                                          
210 Ibid. 
211 ECtHR, Delfi AS v. Estonia, Application no. 64569/09, 10th October 2013, available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-126635#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-
126635%22]} (last visited on 14th July 2015). 
212 McNamee, J. and Fernández Pérez, M. (Eds.), Human Rights Violations Online…, Op. cit., p.10. 
213 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal 
aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32000L0031&from=EN 
(last visited on 7th July 2015). 
214 A type of Internet Service Provider (ISP). 
215 McNamee, J. and Fernández Pérez, M. (Eds.), Human Rights Violations Online…, Op. cit., p.8.  
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the Delfi case. Not alone did Delfi lose its case before several instances, but cases like 
this one pushed the Estonian company to adopt stricter measures. Following this case, 
other ISPs may adopt a “real name policy” – to the detriment of all Internet users’ 
privacy and freedom of expression’s rights – and more extensive pre- or post-
publication self-censorship tools to avoid facing liability and paying for damages. 
   
Yet, in the so-called ‘Telekabel case’, which was brought before the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU), 216 the CJEU “relied on an assumption that the pressures 
(an injunction) for the internet intermediary to restrict access [due to alleged intellectual 
property rights infringements] were counterbalanced by unspecified other obligations to 
uphold users' fundamental rights.”217 This is evidenced in para. 63 of the CJEU ruling, 
which states that: 
“even though the measures taken when implementing an injunction such as that at issue 
in the main proceedings are not capable of leading, in some circumstances, to a 
complete cessation of the infringements of the intellectual property right, they cannot 
however be considered to be incompatible with the requirement that a fair balance be 
found, in accordance with Article 52(1), in fine, of the Charter, between all applicable 
fundamental rights, provided that (i) they do not unnecessarily deprive internet users of 
the possibility of lawfully accessing the information available and (ii) that they have the 
effect of preventing unauthorised access to protected subject-matter or, at least, of 
making it difficult to achieve and of seriously discouraging internet users who are using 
the services of the addressee of that injunction from accessing the subject-matter that 
has been made available to them in breach of the intellectual property right.” 
  
As stated elsewhere, “[t]hat suggests that, if the Telekabel assumption is incorrect [as 








                                                          
216 Court of Justice of the European Union, UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v Constantin Film Verleih 
GmbH, Wega Filmproduktionsgesellschaft mbH, C-314/12, 27th March 2014, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d2dc30d5a910a3a8a4864c3fb194fea0
fadffd3a.e34KaxiLc3qMb40Rch0SaxuQbhf0?text=&docid=149924&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=l
st&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=51610 (last visited on 14th July 2015). 
217 McNamee, J. and Fernández Pérez, M. (Eds.), Human Rights Violations Online…, Op. cit., p.11. 
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III. HUMAN RIGHTS ONLINE 
 
Once seen the different mechanisms of control in both China and the EU, we focus on 
the framework under which Human rights and fundamental freedoms must be respected 
in each case. 
 
But what do we mean when we refer to Human Rights?  
 
The Constitutional law expert Peña González considers that the topic of human rights 
relates to the positioning of men vis-à-vis power in its various manifestations, i.e. the 
power held by the State or the government against the liberty of those who obey the 
ones in power.219 Peña González differentiates between Human rights and Fundamental 
rights. Whereas Human rights are the subjective rights of individuals, Fundamental 
rights are subjective rights which are materialised into laws, including a Constitution, 
and are sometimes internationalised. They are universal, inalienable (i.e. their 
ownership is untransferable), imprescriptible (i.e. even if they are not exercised, they 
cannot be waived).220 More precisely, the Vienna Declaration and its Programme of 
Action state that “human rights are ‘universal, indivisible and interdependent and 
interrelated’”.221 Peña’s approach allows us to understand that even if in countries like 
China Human rights are enshrined in the law, they have a different stand as, for 
example, EU countries. For the purposes of this paper, we only refer to “human rights”. 
 
In previous chapters, we identified examples of violations of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms online. In this section, we further explore whether the human 
rights online situation in China is very different from the situation in the EU or its 
Member States. Although the baseline scenario and policy making is different in 
substance, we argue there are several fissures in the EU legal framework which lead us 
to argue that human rights and freedoms are being eroded inside the European Union. 
Besides the democratic principles and strong legal framework and enforcement, 
improvements in policy- and decision-making are needed. 
 
                                                          
219 Peña González, J., Derecho y Constitución, Ed. Dykinson S.L., Madrid, 2004, pp. 494, 495. 
220 Ibid, p.497.  
221 OHCHR, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 25th June 1993, para. 5, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Vienna.aspx (last visited on 29th January 2015). 
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We first explore the different perspectives in both China and the European Union as 
regards the enjoyment of and restrictions to human rights and fundamental freedoms 
online. Secondly, we further analyse this situation by focusing on two examples: the 
right to privacy and freedom of expression. Finally, we make an assessment on the right 
to an effective remedy. The Internet has become an unprecedented tool for the 
promotion of freedom of expression and freedom of association or freedom of collective 
action. However, it also generates risks to privacy, the protection of personal data or 
security. Yet, there is a common global legal standard according to which restrictions to 
human rights and freedoms must be imposed by law. If human rights and freedoms are 
limited, citizens must thus have the right to an effective remedy. Is this complied with in 
the same way in China and in the EU? 
 
1. Human Rights online in China as compared to the EU 
 
According to the UN Human Rights Council Resolution on promotion, protection and 
enjoyment of human rights on the Internet of July 2012,222 human rights offline must 
also apply online. We are of the view, however, that human rights offline cannot be 
directly translated online due to the particularity of the Internet, due to its complexity 
and technology development.  
 
The Internet has been and is a human rights enabler. Nonetheless, the Internet has 
become a tool which can be used to threaten its users in an unprecedented manner; in a 
way that the offline world did not know before.223 Professor Jakubowicz identifies four 
ways in which Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs)224 have an 
impact on human rights: 
 
                                                          
222 UN Human Rights Council, The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet, 
UN Doc. A/HRC/20/L.13, 5th July 2012. 
223 Kulesza, J., Protecting Human Rights Online…, Op. cit., p. 2. 
224 “Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) are a collection of technologies and 
applications that enable the electronic storage, retrieval, processing and transfer of data to a wide variety 
of users: individuals, households, enterprises from most of the industries and public sector organisations. 
The Information Society describes a society where ICT, especially the Internet and mobile phones, affect 
many and different levels of society and the economy.” Understood in its broader sense, it plays a key 
development role in both social and economic terms. Cf. CSIL and PPMI, Internet, digital agenda and 
economic development of European regions, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department 
B: Structural and Cohesion Policies, Study, Vol. I., for the European Parliament’s Committee on 
Regional Development, PE 513.970, September 2013, pp. 13-15, available online at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/studies (last visited on 29th January 2015).  
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First, ICTs have a multiplier effect on human rights, by adding a new dimension to their 
exercise, protection and violation. Second, ICTs have a quality impact on human rights, 
by providing new possibilities to protect and exercise human rights and to present 
criminal actions. Third, ICTs can influence some human rights to the point of redefining 
them, by way of “adding cyberspace as a new universe for their exercise”. The right of 
free elections is a clear example of this. Fourth, ICTs have the ability to enhance human 
rights in a way never experienced before, but at the same time ICTs may create 
divisions based on those who do not benefit from ICTs yet. Such is the case of freedom 
of expression or freedom of assembly and association.225  
 
In China, there are new forms of censorship that are being further developed, as we 
discussed in Chapter two. In the future, it is likely it will be more difficult to measure 
different forms of censorship and this is not only happening in China, but around the 
world. China’s practices of restricting freedom of expression and privacy rights, for 
instance, are being replicated in other countries, but China learns from other countries 
as well. 
 
Many rights of the Chinese citizens are set forth in the law, such as the public’s right to 
access information, the right to be heard or the right to privacy. However, those rights 
and freedoms must be exercised in accordance with the Chinese law.226 The problem is 
that the Chinese understanding of the rule of law differs from the international or the 
European concept of the rule of law.227  
 
The concept of the 'rule of law' in China was coined by the reform policy launched by 
Deng Xiaoping in 1979. It differs from the western concept of ‘rule of law’ because in 
China the ‘rule of law’ goes along with the Socialist system with Chinese 
characteristics. On 23rd October 2014, at the 4th Plenary Session of the 18th Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the latter undertook a Decision to 
“accelerate the construction of a Socialist rule of law country”, moving forward the 
                                                          
225 Jakubowicz, K., Media revolution in Europe: ahead of the curve, Council of Europe Publishing, 
August 2011, pp. 120-123. 
226 Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Op. cit. 
227 In the EU, this principle is enshrined in Article 52 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
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country in accordance with the law.228 “The Party comes first”229, that is, the 
government has wide discretion to enact legislation to stop practices which it does not 
deem appropriate in accordance with its communist system, principles and ideology 
enshrined in the law and thus has the ability to sanction them.230  
 
The Chinese notion of the rule of law does not correspond with the requirements set 
forth under international law. In fact, the legality principle would not be enough in order 
for China to fulfil its obligations under the ‘rule of law’ principle. As the UN Secretary-
General established in its 2004 report,231 
“the rule of law [is] a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and 
entities, public or private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are 
publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are 
consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, 
measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the 
law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of 
powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and 
procedural and legal transparency.” 
 
China does not seem to qualify to respect the rule of law according to such criteria. 
Matheny shows this contradiction very well: 
“In 2011, the UN Human Rights Council condemned the arbitrary blocking or filtering 
of information on the Internet in its “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion 
and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression.” The report singled 
out China specifically stating, “China, which has in place one of the most sophisticated 
and extensive systems for controlling information on the Internet, has adopted extensive 
filtering systems that block access to websites containing key terms such as 
‘democracy’ and ‘human rights’. The Special Rapporteur is deeply concerned that 
                                                          
228 Scholars Drs. Roger Creemers and Jeremy L. Daum translated the decision into English, cf. 
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Decision to “accelerate the construction of a 
Socialist rule of law country”, 28th October 2014, available in English at 
https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/10/28/ccp-central-committee-decision-concerning-
some-major-questions-in-comprehensively-moving-governing-the-country-according-to-the-law-forward/ 
(last visited on 11th January 2015). 
229 Subba, B.B., 18th CPC Central Committee Fourth Plenum: Rule of Law with Chinese Characteristics, 
Institute of Chinese Studies, No. 22, Delhi, November 2014, available at 
http://www.icsin.org/ICS/ICSAnalysispdf/32.pdf (last visited on 11th January 2015).  
230 See Peerenboom’s analysis of the Decision of 23rd October 2014 at Peerenboom, R., Fly High the 
Banner of Socialist Rule of Law with Chinese Characteristics! What Does the 4th Plenum Decision Mean 
for Legal Reforms in China?, 6th November  2014, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2519917 (last 
visited on 11th January 2015). 
231 UN Secretary-General, Report on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-
Conflict Societies, S /2004/616, 23rd August 2004, para. 6, available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/395/29/PDF/N0439529.pdf?OpenElement (last visited on 11th January 
2015). 
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[Internet censorship has become] increasingly sophisticated, with multi-layered controls 
that are often hidden from the public.” 232 
 
Ironically, every member of the UN Human Rights Council, including China, signed the 
2012 resolution to protect human rights on the Internet. The idea that internet should 
come unrestricted is obviously popular but, as with many issues the UN tackles, a 
signature can sometimes mean very little. China’s delegate stipulated that “free flow of 
information on the Internet and safe flow of information on the Internet are mutually 
dependent,” in a sign that the country is not about to tear down the “Great Firewall of 
China” anytime soon.” 233 
 
Is this China’s fault or is it a problem of international law, one may wonder. Mattei and 
Nader offer an interesting and unpopular perspective, arguing the problem arises from 
international law. “To judge aspects of the rule of law to be illegal in a fundamental 
sense requires indigenous legal standards separate from nation state and modern 
globalized legal structures”, they argue. In fact, international human rights is “a 
problematic notion because it provides a selective justification for intervention in the 
internal political business of all states that are not culturally aligned with Western or 
imperial rule of law.” “International law thus has an ambiguous relationship with the 
imperial rule of law. While one would think that its development and centralization 
might limit the imperial sovereign and thus establish legality, in fact it establishes 
double standards and political non-accountability”,234 they add. Peerenboom seems to 
agree:  
“China lacks the soft power to challenge the global dominance of the liberal democratic 
conception of rule of law. Liberals will continue to push for reforms consistent with the 
globally dominant conception, and critics at home and abroad will, fairly or unfairly, 
continue to assess reforms and measure China against the standard of liberal democratic 
rule of law.”235 
 
But are these contradictions in the conception of the ‘rule of law’ reflected in the way in 
the European Union? 
 
                                                          
232 Matheny, S., Net Neutrality: The Struggle for Internet Freedom, 30th September 2013, available at 
http://globalsolutions.org/blog/2013/09/Net-Neutrality-Struggle-Internet-Freedom#.VYaIjUa1dcM (last 
visited on 21st June 2015). 
233 Ibid. 
234 Mattei, U. and Nader, L., Plunder. When the Rule of Law is Illegal, Blackwell Publishing, United 
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The immediate answer is ‘no, they are not’ because of the strong and generally 
enforceable legal and political framework in the EU. However, there have been cases 
where restrictions to fundamental rights and freedoms have been violated in a 
disproportionate way. 
 
Concerning the rule of law, McNamee very well summarises the situation: “[T]he rule 
of law is affirmed four times in the Treaty on European Union. It is "confirmed" in the 
preamble of the Treaty and restated in Article 6. The EU also places an obligation on 
itself to contribute to the objective of consolidating "democracy and the rule of law" in 
its development policy (Article 21) and common foreign and security policy (Article 
22). Furthermore, the European Convention on Fundamental Rights and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights place obligations on EU Member States and on the Commission 
(ratification of the European Convention of Human Rights, the “ECHR”, is pending) 
that restrictions to freedoms must be based on law.”236 
 
Besides this strong legal framework in favour of the rule of law, cases of censorship are 
not absent, as we have seen in Chapter two.  
 
In sum, the differences of both systems seem clear. Freedom of expression will not be 
truly enjoyed unless respect of privacy in communications is ensured.237 
 
Even if international law applies to the Chinese people, there is a lack of enforcement – 
to the detriment of the population of China. Freedom of speech and the right to privacy, 
as recognised in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the ICCPR are two 
clear examples of regular violations of human rights online in China. So the question 
that should be asked is, can the international legal framework be enforced to promote 
freedom of expression and protect privacy online?  
 
                                                          
236 McNamee, J., Privatised online enforcement series: A. Abandonment of the rule of law, 23rd March 
2011, available at https://edri.org/edrigramnumber9-6abandonment-rule-of-law/ (last visited on 21st June 
2015). 
237 Cf. paras. 76, 77, 81-99 of the Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/23/40. See also Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, State communication 
surveillance undermines freedom of expression, warns UN expert, 4th June 2013, available at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13400&LangID=E (last 
visited on 29th January 2015). 
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2. Restrictions to freedom of expression and privacy 
 
Internet innovation technologies have allowed netizens to enjoy freedom of expression 
at its fullest. Nevertheless, technology has been and can be used to impair civil rights 
and liberties, among which freedom of expression and the right to privacy are of 
particular relevance. 
 
China has a different approach than Europe.  
 
On the one hand, it formally recognises freedom of speech in its Article 35 of the 
Chinese Constitution. Although China would comply with the legality principle, it 
would not be enough in order for China to respect the ‘rule of law’, as explained before.  
 
According to the Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of 
China, however, 
“Chinese citizens fully enjoy freedom of speech on the Internet. The Constitution of the 
People's Republic of China confers on Chinese citizens the right to free speech.”238 
“The Internet provides unprecedented convenience and a direct channel for the people 
to exercise their right to know, to participate, to be heard and to oversee, and is playing 
an increasingly important role in helping the government get to know the people's 
wishes, meet their needs and safeguard their interests. The Chinese government is 
determined to unswervingly safeguard the freedom of speech on the Internet enjoyed by 
Chinese citizens in accordance with the law.” 239 
 
From 2000 onwards, information society services provided in China increased in a very 
significant way. The start of the XXI century was marked by the proliferation of 
electronic commerce services, such as Taobao, which is the Chinese equivalent to Ebay 
or Amazon.  
 
Social networks also marked the beginning of the first decade of the XIX century. 
Xiaonei (whose name “Renren”), for instance, was launched in 2005, which is a similar 
network as Facebook. In 2010, Weibo represented the success of the microblogging 
phenomenon in China. 240 The expansion of microblogs like Weibo has allowed sharing 
and receiving information in a way unexperienced before in China. The most known 
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microblogs in China (Weibo, Sohu, Netease and Tecent) have removed or suspended 
users’ accounts, imposed real-name registration requirements as of 16th March 2012 or 
hide content (including keywords) which disregards the law. However, some 
microbloggers have found ways to circumvent repression from the government, by 
setting up new accounts, using different keywords, among others.241   
 
From an international law perspective, China’s Internet control policy would violate 
freedom of expression242 as enshrined in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) and Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR).  
 
The UDHR defines freedom of expression as the “freedom to hold opinions without 
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media 
and regardless of frontiers”. The ICCPR specifies that restrictions may be imposed 
provided they are applied pursuant to the law and are deemed necessary “[f]or respect of 
the rights or reputations of others” or “for the protection of national security or of public 
order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.”  
 
Whereas China is a signatory party of both international instruments, it has not ratified 
the ICCPR. By signing, China expressed its willingness or intention to be bound by it. 
Yet, the ICCPR is not binding on China or transposed meaningfully into Chinese law. 
In this regard, some scholars argue that even if China signed and ratified the ICCPR, it 
would do so with many reservations, undermining the importance of its ratification.243 
In the same vein, “the United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion 
and Expression, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 
Representative on Freedom of the Media, the Organization of American States (OAS) 
                                                          
241 Yong, H., Spreading the news, in Schmidt, N. (Ed.), Digital Frontiers, Index on censorship, Volume 
21. No. 4, Sage Publications, 2012, pp. 107-111. 
242 For a deeper study, see Human Rights Committee, General comment No. 34, Article 19: Freedoms of 
opinion and expression,102nd session, July 2011, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34, paras. 3, 9, 21-23, 25 and 
27. 
243 Free Speech Debate, Article 19: freedom of expression anchored in international law, 10th February 
2012, available at http://freespeechdebate.com/en/discuss/article-19-freedom-of-expression-anchored-in-
international-law/ (last visited on 17th June 2014). Other scholars like Joe McNnamee made the case that 
the opposite is true – a country that is not taking an instrument seriously is less likely to set reservations. 
See McNamee, J., Should Reporting-based Human Rights Treaties Be Considered “Binding International 
law”?, University of Kent, Brussels, 1st September 2006, available at 
http://www.ibrarian.net/navon/paper/Should_Reporting_based_Human_Rights_Treaties_Be_C.pdf?paper
id=8325925 (last visited on 3rd August 2015). 
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Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and 
Access to Information”244 worked together to issue a yearly Joint Declaration on the 
International Mechanisms for Promoting Freedom of Expression, in which 
recommendations are issued mainly for States, but also for other actors. By analysing its 
latest declaration,245 we acknowledge their recommendations are too broad and vague to 
appreciate a precise impact to promote freedom of expression in China. 
 
On the other hand, the right to privacy is proven “to be a prerequisite to the capacity to 
participate in social discourse. Where privacy is dismantled, both the chance for 
personal assessment of the political and societal process and the opportunity to develop 
and maintain a particular style of life fade.”246 Yet, privacy is not fully respected in 
China. 
 
Even if privacy is formally recognised by the State, the official policy position of China 
is the following: 
“[t]he state protects citizens' online privacy. The protection of online privacy is closely 
connected with the people's sense of security and confidence in the Internet. The 
Chinese government proactively promotes the improvement of relevant legislation and 
Internet corporate service regulations, in order to steadily enhance online privacy 
protection systems. The Decision of the National People's Congress Standing 
Committee on Guarding Internet Security stipulates that illegal interception, tampering 
with or deletion of others' e-mails or other data and infringement upon citizens' freedom 
and privacy of correspondence that constitutes a crime shall be investigated for criminal 
liability. According to the self-disciplinary public pledges of the Internet industry, 
Internet service providers are responsible for protecting users' privacy. The providers 
shall announce their relevant privacy protection commitment when providing services, 
provide reporting and reception channels for privacy infringement and take effective 
measures to protect users' privacy.”247 
 
In the same vein, the Government claims privacy is also protected at the network level. 
According to the Chinese computer Information Network and Internet Security, 
Protection and Management Regulations, “the freedom and privacy of network users is 
protected by law. No unit or individual may, in violation of these regulations, use the 
                                                          
244 See http://www.osce.org/fom/118298 (last visited on 17th June 2014). 
245 See http://www.osce.org/fom/118298?download=true (last visited on 17th June 2014). 
246 Simitis,S., Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U.PA. L. REV. 707, 734, 1987. 
247 Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Op. cit. 
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Internet to violate the freedom and privacy of network users.” 248 Yet, this is not fully 
ensured in practice. 
 
From an international perspective, the right to privacy is set forth in both the UDHR and 
the ICCPR, respectively in Articles 12 and 17. These instruments define this right as the 
prohibition of arbitrary or unlawful interferences to individuals’ privacy, family, home 
or correspondence and of unlawful attacks to their honour or reputation. 
 
While the non-binding UDHR contains a general restrictive clause in its Article 29 para. 
2, which makes the exercise of all rights and freedoms named in the Declaration subject 
to limitations determined by law “solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and 
respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of 
morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society”, no such general 
reference or one relating directly to privacy can be found in the ICCPR. However, 
individual restrictive clauses can be found for other rights, such as Article 19 para. 2, 
allowing for legitimate limitation of the freedom of expression.” 249 
 
In the European Union, both the freedom of expression and the right to privacy are 
recognised as fundamental rights respectively in Articles 11 and 7 of the EU Charter of 
fundamental rights. This complements the rights embedded in national law, starting 
from the constitutions; the rights recognised under international human rights law and 
the  ECHR. Regarding the latter, Article 6(3) of the Treaty on the European Union 
(TEU) establishes that “fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from 
the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general 
principles of the Union's law.”  Yet, sometimes these freedoms and rights are violated, 
as demonstrated in Chapter two of this study. 
 
In sum, China and EU countries have different approaches towards the freedom of 
expression and the right to privacy. However, this does not mean that the EU is exempt 
of committing violations to human rights and freedoms online. Yet, when these happen, 
                                                          
248 Chinese computer Information Network and Internet Security, Op. cit., Section seven. 
249 Kulesza, J., Protecting Human Rights Online…, Op. cit., p.18. 
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how do the Chinese system and the European system respond to human rights 
restrictions online? 
 
3. The Right to an effective remedy 
 
Concerning the situation of redress in China, Internet users do not enjoy of an effective 
remedy in the Western meaning. In this context, the Chinese judicial system has to be 
understood within the whole Chinese’s political, social and legal system. 
 
Guided by the principle of double instance250, the Chinese judiciary is divided into four 
levels: the local people’s courts, which are subdivided into basic people’s courts; 
intermediate people’s courts and higher people’s courts251; special people’s courts 
(military, railway and transport and maritime courts) and the Supreme People’s 
Court252.253 However, China’s judicial system is not solely composed of the people’s 
court system, but also of both the people’s procuratorate and the public security 
systems.254 Strictly speaking, the judiciary comprises the two first ones.  
 
Notwithstanding the lack of accurate and complete empirical data255, scholars note that 
the Chinese judicial system is highly affected by various weaknesses. For the purposes 
of clarity, we have non-exhaustively regrouped them into ten. 
 
First, there is a problem of substance, since most of the restrictions imposed to human 
rights and freedoms online would not pass the international tests of necessity and 
proportionality. For instance, in 2013, the Chinese Supreme Court issued a decision that 
“limit[ed] to 500 the number of times a post [could] be reposted without the original 
                                                          
250 See Arts. 10 et seq. of the Organic Law of the People's courts of the People's Republic of China. 
251 Art. 2 (3) of the Organic Law of the People's courts of the People's Republic of China. 
252 While the Supreme People’s Court is the highest court; the Higher People’s Courts are courts of the 
provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities; the Intermediate People’s Courts are for capitals or 
prefectures within the provincial level; and the Basic People’s Courts are for counties, municipal districts 
and autonomous counties. Moreover, the Basic People’s Courts can establish people’s district level 
tribunals (usually in big towns), whose decisions have the same legal effects. For more information, see 
http://guides.library.harvard.edu/chineselegalresearch (last visited on 20th January 2014).  
253 Arts. 123 et seq. of the Chinese Constitution; art. 11 of the Judges Law of the People's Republic of 
China of 2001. 
254 See  http://www.olemiss.edu/courses/pol324/chnjudic.htm (last visited on 20th January 2014). 
255 With the consequences attached to it, such as unfounded generalised statements; cf. Clarke, D. C., 
Empirical Research Into the Chinese Judicial System, 15th July 2003, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=412660 (last visited on 20th January 2014).  
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author’s assuming legal responsibility. Because spreading false rumors is a crime, the 
decision mean[t] that anyone who writes a popular but subversive post could be held 
liable and face prison time.” 256 A famous case involving imprisonment was the case of 
writer Yang Tongyan, who was arrested in China 9 years ago due to his writings, 
involvement in protests, among other charges. He was punished with 12-year 
imprisonment.257 
 
Second, the majority of judges in China lack of technical competences and the judicial 
system suffers from inefficiency. In 2001, the Judges Law tried to improve the situation 
by requiring judges to comply with a set of minimum requirements. Their non-
fulfilment may lead to dismissal, an obligation to receive training or transfer to non-
judicial positions. In addition, inefficiency is also linked to judges’ remuneration. 
Although they have now to pass the same public competition as lawyers and 
procurators, judges are not well paid, especially those in the lower scales of the judicial 
hierarchy.258  
 
Third, there is a disparity between lower/rural courts and higher/urban ones. Courts set 
up in poorer areas do not have enough technical, material or human resources.  
 
Fourth, the principle of public hearings is not fully respected. The principle of public 
hearings is set out in the law,259 but it is sometimes restricted by the law itself, which 
imposes limitations in case of state secrecy, individual privacy or crimes committed by 
minors, among others. Other times, this principle is impaired by material deficiencies 
related to the budget of some courts. Positively, the law allows parties or the People’s 
“procuracy” to lodge an appeal to annul the decision should this principle be infringed, 
but the implementation of this mechanism is doubtful. 260   
 
                                                          
256New York Times, Gregarious and direct China’s web doorkeeper, 2nd December 2014, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/world/asia/gregarious-and-direct-chinas-web-doorkeeper.html (last 
visited on 5th January 2015). 
257 See his case at http://www.pen.org/defending-writers/test-first-name-test-middle-name-test-last-
name/yang-tongyan (last visited on 29th January 2015). 
258 See Art. 9 of the 2001 Judges Law of the People's Republic of China; Cf. Garot, M.-J., El poder 
judicial en China: ¿independiente y eficaz?, InDret, Vol. 2, 2009, May 2009, pp. 12 et seq., available at 
http://www.indret.com/pdf/629_es.pdf (last visited on 20th January 2014). 
259 Art. 7 of the Organic Law of the People's courts of the People's Republic of China. 
260 Garot, M.-J., Op. cit, p.9. 
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Fifth, the principle of publicity and media coverage is not respected. Notwithstanding 
the legal reforms encouraged by the entry into the WTO and the efforts carried out by 
the Supreme People’s Court, most of the court rulings are not being published or even 
drafted, especially at the local level.261  
 
Sixth, the rights of defence and the non bis in idem principle are impaired. The Chinese 
system does not offer the same judicial remedies as the Western countries do.262  For 
instance, the Supreme People’s Court, a higher court or even the procuratorate or the 
People‘s “procuracy” are entitled to re-examine a case or ask the lower court to re-
decide the case in another way, which puts their impartiality and independence into 
question. In 2007, the Chinese Civil Procedural law introduced some reforms in this 
regard, including new possibilities to ask for a new trial or re-examination. Although the 
fact that the Chinese judicial approach is not the same as the Western approach , this is 
not automatically a deficiency.Conversely, the reforms put in place  do not seem to be 
sufficient.263 
 
Seventh, the most pressing concern is judicial independence, with some analysis 
suggesting that this is in fundamental contradiction with a single-party communist 
state.264 Surprisingly, however, judicial independence in democracies is sometimes 
narrower than in authoritarian regimes.265 Contrary to most of the criticisms, the 
Communist Party of China is not always the main source of interference. Both systemic 
and non-systemic interferences can be justified in some instances (e.g. the intervention 
of senior judges could be justified by the lack of experience or competence of lower 
judges), but what is really important is the impact on the outcome of court cases. The 
key then becomes to find a balance between accountability and being subject to 
political, economic or social factors when deciding a case.266 Following Peerenboom’s 
                                                          
261 Ibid. 
262 Ibid., p. 7. 
263 Ibid., p.8. 
264 Although China is officially described as a multi-party country.  
Cf. http://www.china.org.cn/english/Political/29034.htm (last visited on 20th January 2014).  
265 See, for instance, Ginsburg, Law and the Liberal Transformation of the Northeast Asian Legal 
Complex in Korea and Taiwan, Fighting for Political Freedom: Comparative Studies of the Legal 
Complex and Political Change, Oxford: Hart Press, 2007. 
266 García-Bolívar, Lack of judicial independence and its impact on transnational and international 
litigation, Law and Business Review of the Americas 18.1, Winter 2012, p. 30. 
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thesis, we argue that judicial independence is not a goal in itself, but “a means to a just 
and efficient judiciary”. 267 
 
According to Peerenboom,268 ‘judicial independence’ is a multifaceted concept which 
consists of decisional, personal, internal, external and collective elements. Decisional 
independence is achieved when the judicial power is exercised independently pursuant 
to the law, not being subject to interferences from other parties. However, under the 
Chinese Constitution, judges experience interferences even within the judiciary.269 For 
its part, personal independence is linked to how judges are appointed, promoted and 
paid and to the impartiality under which cases are assigned to them. The Chinese 
legislature participates in this process, greatly influencing the most important positions 
in the judiciary. In China, courts are financed by local governments and the standing 
committee of local people's congresses may select assessors to participate in a case. In 
this sense, the latter have the same authority as judges.270 As a result, this puts pressure 
on judges to be biased by local protectionism. On the other hand, the internal and 
external independence of the Chinese judicial system is challenged by two factors. First, 
judicial rulings may be subject to approval of an adjudicative committee or senior 
judges. Second, the judiciary is affected by external sources, namely the Party, People’s 
congresses and the “procuracy”, local governments and administrations,  public opinion 
or judges’ acquaintances.271 In other words, both the internal and external independence 
of Chinese judges are not assured. Finally, Professor Peerenboom considers that 
collective independence is based on the authority of the courts as a whole and on the 
ability to be free from undue influences. In this sense, much more remains to be done, 
notwithstanding the recent progress. This is confirmed by results of the Global 
Competitiveness Report 2014-2015 conducted by the World Economic Forum Report, 
                                                          
267 Peerenboom, R., Judicial Independence in China: Common Myths and Unfounded Assumptions, La 
Trobe Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2008/11, p. 11, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1283179 (last visited on 20th January 2014). 
268 Ibid. 
269 Art. 126 of the Chinese Constitution 
270 Art. 38 of the Organic Law of the People's courts of the People's Republic of China. 
271 Fu, Y. and Peerenboom, R.,  A New Analytical Framework for Understanding and Promoting Judicial 
Independence in China, 1st February  2009, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1336069 (last visited on 
20th January 2014). 
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under which China scored 4.0 out of 7. This report includes the assessment of 144 
countries and from 1 to 7, ‘seven’ represents the “best possible outcome”.272  
 
Eighth, the implementation of decisions is jeopardised because of the lack of 
cooperation between some agencies; power struggles between the judiciary itself and 
with the “procuracy” or the ambiguous relations between the Chinese Communist Party 
and the courts.273 
 
Ninth, in a society in which guantxi (personal networking) is essential, it is difficult to 
overcome corruption, which is intrinsically linked to the absence of judicial 
independence.274 In fact, China ranked 100 out of 175 countries in the 2014 Corruption 
Perceptions index. It scored 36 out of 100, being 0 “very clean” and 0 “highly corrupt”. 
Taking the form of bribery and misappropriation, corruption has become so significant 
that the government is taking direct action to fight it.275  
 
In any case, corruption is not the only area in which the government is investing efforts. 
Indeed, a number of reforms have been carried out to alleviate the aforementioned 
weaknesses. We focus on two reforms, the 2007 Civil Procedural Law reform and the 
2014 Decision of the Communist Party to “accelerate the construction of a Socialist rule 
of law country”.  
 
The abovementioned 2007 Civil Procedural law276 has set forth procedural economy 
measures, improvements to litigants’ rights, increased transparency277, enforcement 
measures or extended implementation deadlines up to two years.278 Secondly, 
professionalism of the judicial authorities has been encouraged and existing 
mechanisms to remove or change judges’ positions should they fail to comply with the 
                                                          
272 Schwab, K. (Ed.) et al., Global Competitiveness Report 2014-2015, World Economic Forum, pp. 101, 
102 and 155, available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2014-
15.pdf (last visited on 11th January 2015). 
273 Lubman, S., Looking for law in China, Columbia Journal of Asian Law, Spring/Fall, p. 26; Cf. Garot, 
M.-J., Op. cit., p. 15. 
274 Garot, M.-J.. Op. cit., pp. 16 et seq. 
275 Cf. http://www.transparency.org/country#CHN (last visited on 11th January 2015).  
276 Another example is shown in Articles 13, 32 and 33 of the 1997 Criminal Law set forth the criminal 
liability of judges in these cases. Cf. Garot, M.-J.. Op. cit., pp. 16 et seq. 
277 See Ye, A., and Song, Y., Justice, efficiency and the new Civil Procedure Law, China Law & Practice, 
Nov/Dec 2012. 
278 Garot, M.-J., Op. cit.. 
  Maryant Nathalie Fernández Pérez 
                 
 
 63 
Internet Control: assessing China in a comparative European context 
law have been reinforced.279 Thirdly, the judiciary has strengthened its authority, as 
evidenced by the increase of case law or by the fact that most of the cases are not 
politically sensitive ones, thus reducing the direct inquiries and influence of the 
Communist Party of China and its organs.280 Fourthly, the third Supreme People’s 
Court’s five-year agenda is enhancing improvements in order to have a more 
professional, efficient and just system.281  
 
On 23rd October 2014, the Chinese Communist Party adopted the abovementioned 
decision to “accelerate the construction of a Socialist rule of law country”, by means of 
which the Chinese Communist Party tried to improve the judicial system. Professor 
Peremboom considers that although the Party has tried to conduct a series of reforms 
which would indeed improve the current judicial system, negative aspects remain. 
 
On the positive side, we can summarise Peremboom’s analysis into three main positive 
aspects. First, the reform tries to increase the efficiency of the system and achieve better 
justice, e.g. by ensuring court rulings are reasoned and contain a legal analysis and 
improving their enforcement. Second, the 2014 reform tries to improve the quality and 
professionalism of judges, by increasing specialisation, requiring an appropriate 
background for becoming a judge, making meritocratic promotions or tackling 
corruption. Third, the reform intends to extend access to justice and make more appeals 
available. 
 
On the negative side, Peeremboom believes human rights’ abused by people being put 
in prison would not suffer any difference in view of the 2014 reform. Secondly, he 
acknowledges progress on the quality and independence of judges, as those who are 
best trained usually leave to the private sector and judges are being “educated” the 
ideology of the Party by the Party itself. Third, disparity between lower/rural courts 
persists. Fourth, the publicity of court procedures and rulings is improved, but freedom 
of speech and assembly are further reduced, further controlling the media coverage and 
                                                          
279 Arts. 14 and 16 of the Chinese Judges Law. 
280 Zhang, X., A law unto themselves: the Chinese government has acknowledged that corruption in the 
judiciary is a serious problem, Hong Kong Lawyer, Vol. Mar, No. 1, Article no. 4, pp. 28-30, 1998, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1810187 (last visited on 20th January 2014).  
281 Cfr. Peerenboom, R., Between Global Norms and Domestic Realities: Judicial Reforms in China, 8th 
May 2009, pp. 7 et seq., available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1401232 (last visited on 20th January 2014). 
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reducing public petitions.282 As Professors Liebman and Wu expressed it, “the real 
question is how often courts fail to decide cases [for] fear of public outcry”.283 
 
Other scholars believe that the latest reforms imply a shift against the law,284 as part of a 
political strategy of the Party to go against the norms. Professor Minzner,285 for 
instance, argues that the reforms promote the Communist Party of China’s propaganda 
instead of truly addressing the flaws of China’s judicial system.286 Yet, some scholars 
like Dr Yuwen Li think that the Chinese’s judicial reform is “an unfolding process of 
modernisation rather than westernisation”.287 In sum, progress has been made to 
accommodate China’s judicial system to international standards of justice, but some 
core issues remain.  
 
Next to this panorama in China, does the European Union have a remedy system free of 
criticism? 
 
In the European Union, the right to an effective remedy is guaranteed both at the 
national level and the EU level. EU Member states must abide by the EU Charter of 
fundamental rights as do the EU institutions. In Article 47 of the Charter, Member states 
and the EU Institutions must ensure that citizens have the right to an effective remedy 
and fair trial. That is not only ensured by national courts and the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, but also applies to other competent parties, such as companies, which 
are required to provide adequate safeguards when fundamental rights and freedoms 
have been breached.  
 
                                                          
282 Peerenboom, R., Fly High the Banner…, Op. Cit., pp. 16-19. 
283 Liebman, B. and Wu., T., China's Network Justice, Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 07-143, 
9th January 2007, p. 51, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=956310 (last visited on 26th June 2015). 
284 E.g. Article 22 of the 2007 Civil Procedure Law. 
285 See Minzner, C.F., China’s Turn Against Law, American Journal of Comparative Law, 2011; 
Washington University in St. Louis Legal Studies Research Paper No. 11-03-01, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1767455 (last visited on 20th January 2014).  
286 “The Internet has become an important channel for people to obtain news. Ever since its introduction 
to China, the Chinese people have been making full use of the Internet to disseminate news.”  See Moody, 
G., Russia And China Both Want To 'Protect Children'; Both Want To Do It By Increasing Censorship, 
13th July 2012, available at https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120712/07000519673/russia-china-both-
want-to-protect-children-both-want-to-do-it-increasing-censorship.shtml (last visited on 14th June 2014). 
287 Li, Y., The Judicial System and Reform in Post-Mao China: Stumbling Towards Justice, The rule of 
law in China and Comparative Perspectives, Ed. Ashgate Publishing Limited, England, 2014, p. 245. 
  Maryant Nathalie Fernández Pérez 
                 
 
 65 
Internet Control: assessing China in a comparative European context 
Article 47 of the Charter is similar to Article 13 of the ECHR. As the European 
Commission puts it, “[t]he Charter is consistent with the [ECHR] adopted in the 
framework of the Council of Europe: when the Charter contains rights that stem from 
this Convention, their meaning and scope are the same”.288 
 
In order to approximate arid legal texts to the people, the Council of Europe elaborated 
a Guide on Human Rights289 for users as well as an Explanatory Memorandum.290 As 
stated elsewhere, 291 
“the Guide and the Explanatory Memorandum clarify [that] there are different types of 
remedies. They can adopt the form of an inquiry, an explanation, a reply, a correction, 
an apology, a reinstatement, reconnection; compensation, among others. Internet users 
shall have the right to "easily accessible" information about their rights and the 
remedies. As pointed out in the Explanatory Memorandum, "no single remedy may 
itself entirely satisfy the requirements of Article 13". Only the "aggregate of remedies 
provided in law may do so".292  
 
Article 13 ECHR solely refers to remedies from national authorities when their rights 
and freedoms are violated. Nevertheless, as both the Guide and the Explanatory 
Memorandum explain, every internet user shall have the right to obtain effective redress 
from ISPs, national and/or European authorities and tribunals.” 
  
Europe has a legal framework which allows for an effective remedy, but the key 
problem the European Union is now facing, most particularly with regard to online 
restrictions, relates to so-called “self-regulatory” measures, which we briefly referred to 
in chapter two. These types of measures leave the positive and negative obligations of 
the twenty-eight Member states of the European Union non enforceable because 
intermediaries do not have a positive or negative obligation to respect human rights 
when they cause them online, usually after being encouraged to do so by governments. 
In other words, EU countries share this problem with China, although to a lesser (but 
                                                          
288 European Commission, EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, DG Justice, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/charter/index_en.htm (last visited on 29th January 2015). 
289 Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)6 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on a Guide to 
human rights for Internet users, 16th April 2014, available at https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=2184807 
(last visited on 15th December 2014). 
290 Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)6 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on a guide to 
human rights for Internet users – Explanatory Memorandum, 16th April 2014, available at 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CM%282014%2931&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=addfinal&Site=
CM&BackColorInternet=C3C3C3&BackColorIntranet=EDB021&BackColorLogged=F5D383 (last 
visited on 15th December 2014). 
291 McNamee, J. and Fernández Pérez, M., Op. Cit., p. 25. 
292 See ECtHR, Silver and others v. UK, no.5947/72; 6205/73; 7052/75; 7061/75; 7107/75; 7113/75; 
7136/75 para. 113; Kudla v. Poland, no. 30210/96, para. 157. 
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growing) extent – due to the political and legal framework that the EU enjoys. We 
explore the role of online intermediaries in the next chapter. 
 
IV. INTERMEDIARIES VIS-À-VIS HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
As shown throughout this paper, digital rights are increasingly being restricted in many 
ways by various actors, including governments, ISPs, search engines and, in general, 
companies working in the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) sector, a 
set of companies which we gather under the category of “intermediaries”. It is important 
to specifically address them because of the role they play in the digital field. David 
Kaye, the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression, expressed this concern in his investiture before the 
UN General Assembly in October 2014:  
“Non-state actors often play a dominant role on the internet today, even in those 
countries where the government exercises substantial control and regulation. My 
predecessors and many others have addressed corporate responsibility issues, and I 
intend to build on their work. For instance, what set of best practices should govern 
those internet actors with a major footprint in social media, commerce, news, and other 
subjects? What responsibilities are owed users and customers where privacy interests 
and expression intersect? How do legal innovations such as the European Court of 
Justice’s so-called right to be forgotten implicate freedom of expression? How can 
actors implement these policies while avoiding violations of freedom of expression? 
What are the appropriate reactions of commercial actors when governments demand 
compliance with rules that are inconsistent with the freedom of expression or other 
rights that implicate expression?”293 
 
This chapter is dedicated to explore those questions. First, we explore the role of foreign 
intermediaries in China in relation to trade law. Secondly, we explore the framework 
under which companies are expected to respect human rights online. Thirdly, we 
conduct a critical assessment on grounds used to restrict human rights and fundamental 
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1. Foreign companies in China and trade law 
 
China has a tradition of being a protectionist country, but it has evolved throughout the 
years.294 This has permitted many foreign corporations –mainly American companies— 
to access the Chinese internet market due to its potential growth. Some of them have 
become famous for their restrictive “self-regulatory” practices in China. We explore two 
examples, Yahoo and Google.  
 
As for Yahoo, a case tarnished its reputation in April 2005, when the company was 
allegedly obliged to release details of the e-mail account of Shi Thao, a Chinese 
journalist. Yahoo was asked by the Chinese authorities to release a set of data that 
included an e-mail the journalist had sent to a Chinese-language site located in the 
United States. The content of the e-mail was already known by public opinion, but that 
did not matter. As a result of Yahoo’s cooperation, the reporter was condemned to ten 
years of imprisonment for having leaked “state secrets”.295 Shi Thao has since been 
released.296 
 
Google was also at the centre of attention. When Google decided to set up in China in 
2006 under the domain ‘google.cn’, it accepted to conduct self-censoring practices in 
order to comply with Chinese law. Otherwise, it would have been held liable for lack of 
action, as explained in this paper. This decision resulted in international criticism from 
the western, notably from the US government, human rights organisations and NGOs, 
asking Google to cease this conduct. Additionally, Google did not succeed in becoming 
the first engine of the country, as this business was led by the state-owned search engine 
Baidu.297 In the beginning, Google justified its practices with a positivist view of the 
                                                          
294 By imposing restrictions on foreign investment, foreign establishment in China or discrimination 
measures based on nationality. See, for instance, CCA Advogados, Legal Guide for Foreign Investors in 
China, 20th September 2010, available at 
http://www.cca-advogados.com/xms/files/Guia_Resumido_ING_02_reduzido.pdf (last visited on 12th 
January 2015). 
295 Conley, N., The Chinese Communist Party's New Comrade: Yahoo's Collaboration with the Chinese 
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296 See, for instance, The Guardian, Shi Tao: China frees journalist jailed over Yahoo emails, 8th 
September 2013, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/08/shi-tao-china-frees-yahoo 
(last visited on 25th April 2014) 
297 Daxue Consulting, Overview of the E-commerce Market in China, 2013, available at 
http://daxueconsulting.com/overview-of-the-e-commerce-market-in-china/ (last visited on 25th April 
2014) 
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law, by stating it had to comply with Chinese laws, arguing that it was at least providing 
information to Chinese netizens about its practices.298 Yet, Google undertook the 
decision to leave China in 2010, shifting its business to Hong Kong.299  
 
Its exit caused many reactions. Some argue Google left because of its non-satisfactory 
economic performance. Currently, ‘Google.com.hk’ has become the 14th best positioned 
site in China.300 This is not particularly impressive  for a company whose ‘google.com’ 
site is the most visited around the globe.301 Others remembered Google’s original 
“Don’t Be Evil” motto. The veil of naivety falls once you realise it actually conducts 
same practices in other countries, or one might be tempted to ask “Will Google Pull Out 
Of India, Australia And Other Countries Over Internet Censorship [as well]?”.302 
 
Other foreign companies have been subject to international scrutiny: Apple was 
criticised for banning Tibet-related apps303; Cisco and Sun Microsystems for providing 
the Chinese Government with the technology to block IP addresses304. In return, they 
have and are facing legal issues. For instance, Cisco was sued twice305 before US 
federal courts in 2011 for enabling the Chinese government to “monitor, capture, and 
kill Chinese citizens for their views and beliefs.”306 In addition, Cisco went through 
battles concerning its business in China. In 2003, Cisco brought an action against 
                                                          
298 For an ethical review on Google’s activity in China, see Musielak, L.T., “Google-ing” China: An 
ethical analysis of Google’s censorship activities in the People’s Republic, 2010, available at 
http://snl.depaul.edu/writing/Googleing%20China.pdf (last visited on 16th June 2014).  
299 See Lee, J-A., Liu, C-Y. and Li, W., Searching for Internet Freedom in China: A Case Study on 
Google's China Experience, 1st April 2013, Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal, Vol. 31, No. 2, 
2013, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2243205 (last visited on 18th March 2014). 
300 Alexa, Top Sites in China, available at http://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/CN (last visited on 
25th April 2014) 
301 Alexa, The top 500 sites on the web, available at http://www.alexa.com/topsites (last visited on 25th 
April 2014) 
302 Masnick, M., Will Google Pull Out Of India, Australia And Other Countries Over Internet 
Censorship?, 14th January 2010, available at  
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100113/2252047738.shtml (last visited on 15th June 2014). 
303 Tibet Post International, Tibet-related apps are censored by technology giant Apple, 5th April 2013, 
available at http://www.thetibetpost.com/en/news/international/3309-tibet-related-apps-are-censored-by-
technology-giant-apple (last visited on 14th June 2014). 
304 Ling, Y., Op. cit, p. 17 
305 Cf. District court for the District of Maryland, Du Daobin, et al. v. Cisco Systems, Inc. et al., case 
8:11-cv-01538-PJM, 24th February 2014, available at https://www.eff.org/files/2014/02/24/4995755-0-
12686.pdf (last visited on 13th July 2015);  and the so-called “Falung Gong case”. See Olukotun, D., 
Human Rights Verdict Could Affect Cisco in China, 24th April 2013, available at 
http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2013/04/24/human-rights-verdict-could-affect-cisco-in-china/ (last 
visited on 15th June 2014). 
306 EFF, Cisco and Abuses of Human Rights in China: Part 1, 8th July 2011, available at 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/07/eff-urges-microsoft-and-cisco-to-reconsider-china (last visited on 
15th June 2014). 
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Huawei, a Chinese undertaking which is the “second largest telecommunications 
equipment company” in the world307, for allegedly stealing some of its IP assets.308 
 
After China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2010, have these 
situations changed? 
 
The Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China stated 
that “China abides by the general obligations and any specific commitment as a WTO 
member, protects the legitimate rights and interests of foreign enterprises in China, and 
provides proper services to those enterprises in their legal business operations 
concerning the Internet.”309  
 
Since the accession to the WTO, China has opened its frontiers in a greater way. For 
instance, in 2013, the government set up a new free trade zone in Shanghai, which was 
followed by the establishment of other twelve free trade zones in others areas of the 
Chinese Territory.310 In order to attract foreign investors, China even removed the ban 
on sites like Facebook, Twitter and the New York Times within the Shanghai Free-
Trade Zone.311 Even though expansion of such policy should be extended beyond Free-
Trade Zones, this limited opening is good news. 
 
Nonetheless, as noted by some scholars, the different forms of censorship and Internet 
control practices in general endanger the compliance with the obligations that China 
engaged to comply with when becoming a member of the WTO. Measures like 
                                                          
307 Intelligence and Security Committee, Foreign involvement in the Critical National Infrastructure. The 
implications for national security, June 2013, p. 5, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/205680/ISC-Report-
Foreign-Investment-in-the-Critical-National-Infrastructure.pdf (last visited on 14th June 2014). 
308 ComputerWire, Cisco sues Huawei over IP ‘theft’, 24th January 2003, 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2003/01/24/cisco_sues_huawei_over_ip/ (last visited on 25th April 2014); 
See also Reuters, Insight: For Cisco and Huawei, a bruising rivalry reaches stalemate, 22th November 
2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/22/us-cisco-huawei-insight-
idUSBRE9AL0NO20131122 (last visited on 14th June 2014). 
309 Cf. Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Op. cit. 
310 Chen, G., Tsang, D. and Ren, D., 12 new free-trade zones to follow in Shanghai's footsteps, South 
China Morning Post, 23rd January 2014, available at http://www.scmp.com/business/china-
business/article/1411417/12-new-free-trade-zones-follow-shanghais-footsteps (last visited on 12th January 
2015). 
311 South China Morning Post, China to lift ban on Facebook – but only within Shanghai free-trade zone, 
24th September 2013, available at http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1316598/exclusive-china-lift-
ban-facebook-only-within-shanghai-free-trade-zone?page=all (last visited on 14th June 2014). 
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filtering312 or blocking sites within its Great Firewall can constitute a protectionist 
measure,313 when discriminating against foreign companies, with no valid justification.  
 
On the one hand, China could be potentially infringing article XI:1 (non-tariff barrier) 
and Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), since 
justifying censorship measures for public morals could hardly be accepted by the Panel 
or the Appellate Body of the WTO, especially because it would be difficult to comply 
with the standards of Article XX’s chapeau. On the contrary, if the Panel or the 
Appellate Body accepted China’s arguments, it would mean that in practice access to 
the Chinese market was restricted and forced foreign companies to comply with China’s 
demands.314  
 
The European Commission pleaded for this possibility.315 However, through the 
analysis of three WTO cases, namely the 2008 EU v China on foreign financial 
information service providers Regulations, the 2009 US v China regarding audiovisual 
products and the 2009 IP rights enforcement of copyrights, Broude reached the 
conclusion that trade law and Human Rights law serve different objectives. Whereas 
trade law’s objective is the liberalisation of trade, Human Rights law’s goals are stricter. 
Therefore, any influence trade law could have in China to promote freedom of 
expression would be secondary or have a side effect. Following western countries’ legal 
reasoning, China justifies Internet policies on the basis of the protection of the general 
interest.316 
 
On the other hand, some scholars have analysed the means available to the US to bring 
a ‘Google China case’ before the WTO Dispute Panel. For instance, Gao examines the 
probabilities of a successful outcome pursuant to the General Agreement on Trade in 
                                                          
312 Read UNESCO, Fostering Freedom Online…Op. cit.,  pp. 100-107. 
313 Erixon, F., Hindley, B. and Lee-Makiyama, H., Protectionism Online: Internet Censorship and 
International Trade Law, available at http://www.ecipe.org/media/publication_pdfs/protectionism-online-
Internet-censorship-and-international-trade-law.pdf (last visited on 17th June 2014). 
314Black, E., China's Internet Censorship Harms Trade, US Companies, 6th December 2011, available at 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/edblack/2011/12/06/chinas-Internet-censorship-harms-trade-us-companies/ 
(last visited on 17th June 2014). 
315 Masnick, M., Is the Great Firewall of China a Trade Barrier? And If So, Does China Care?, 17th May 
2010, available at https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100517/0102209437.shtml (last visited on 15th 
June 2014)  
316 Broude, Tomer and Hestermeyer, Holger P., The First Condition of Progress? Freedom of Speech and 
the Limits of International Trade Law, 5th May 2013, Virginia Journal of International Law, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2260969 (last visited on 13th July 2015). 
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Services (GATS). As a result of his research, Gao concluded that challenging “the 
Chinese internet censorship regime” based on trade law grounds would be difficult.  
 
First, Gao argues it would be difficult for the US to prove that the services provided by 
Google would fall within the Schedule of Specific Commitments of China because they 
are not exactly “value-added telecom services”, but “data base services”. Even if they 
were included in the definition of the former, a claim under Articles XVI (market 
access) or XVII (national treatment) would be hard, at least for “selective filtering”. The 
reason is that even if domestic companies are not subject to the same obligations as 
foreign companies, that is because the Great Firewall only applies to servers which are 
located outside China. Besides such technicalities, national websites are subject to other 
mechanisms of control. They are not subject to filtering. For instance, when an Internet 
user wants to create a blog post with the words “Falun Gong”317, an automatic error 
message is generated. In such a case, there is no need for a Chinese company to filter 
the content. Accordingly, the fact that domestic and foreign companies are not subject 
to the same mechanisms of control does not necessarily mean foreign companies are 
treated in “less favourable” way. The US would need to bring evidence to the contrary 
to make a case. However, Gao deems more appropriate and easier for the US to resort to 
Articles VI (domestic regulation) and II (most favoured nation treatment) of the GATS.  
According to Article VI.I of the GATS, for instance, the US would have to demonstrate 
that “all [Chinese] measures of general application affecting trade in services are [not] 
administrated in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner”, which seems easier to 
prove. 
 
Nevertheless, if the US pleaded for GATS violations and succeeded in finding evidence 
to prove it, China could invoke the exception provided for in Article XIV a) (public 
morals or public order). In such a case, China would need to demonstrate the measures 
applied are necessary and do not represent a means of “arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination”.  
 
                                                          
317 “Falun Gong” is a spiritual practice, whose practitioners suffered persecution and prosecution in 
China. See, for instance, Greenlee, M.J., A King Who Devours His People: Jiang Zemin and the Falun 
Gong Crackdown: A Bibliography, International Journal of Legal Information: Vol. 34: Iss. 3, Article 9, 
January 2006, available at 
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1074&context=ijli (last visited on 27th June 
2015). 
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Finally, even if the US won the case, the enforcement of the decision would not be 
enough to end with China’s practices over the Internet. States are only urged to comply 
with the law; there’s no specific enforcement mechanism.318 The same could apply with 
a European company which wanted the EU to challenge the Chinese protectionist 
system via trade law. At the time of writing, there is no known trade case, but a case 
could still happen. 
 
The European market is not as protectionist as the Chinese market. Both European and 
Chinese companies should (at least morally) respect human rights online, but there is 
evidence to sustain that companies sometimes act in an arbitrary way both in China and 
in Europe. In the next two sections, we explore the grounds for companies to respect 
human rights and grounds that allow them to restrict Internet users’ fundamental 
freedoms and Human rights. 
 
2. Grounds for companies to respect Human Rights 
 
Due to the societal need for companies to respect human rights in the online 
environment, the UN established business standards, such as those enshrined in the UN 
Global Compact (2000), and further elaborated norms regarding the responsibilities of 
transnational corporations and other forms of business with regard to Human Rights.319  
 
On the other hand, ICT companies have taken the initiative to abide by certain 
principles and behaviours. In fact, there are corporations which have committed to 
respect codes of conduct to the extent possible, since they are usually based on a 
voluntary basis. For instance, Google, Microsoft and Yahoo launched the Global 
network initiative (GNI) in 2006 with the purported aim to advance in the freedom of 
expression and respect of privacy, although it is difficult to imagine that the avoidance 
of regulation was not at least part of their motivation.320 Although the GNI was initially 
conceived as an initiative for corporations, scholars, investors and some members of the 
                                                          
318 Gao, H.S., Google’s China Problem: A Case Study on Trade, Technology and Human Rights Under 
the GATS, Asian Journal of WTO & International Health Law and Policy (AJWH), Vol. 6, pp. 347-385, 
2011, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1976611 (last visited on 31st March 2014).  
319 For more information, see Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, available at http://business-
humanrights.org/en/un-secretary-generals-special-representative-on-business-human-rights (last visited 
on 22nd January 2015). 
320 See https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/faq/index.php (last visited on 17th June 2014). 
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civil society have committed to abide by it. What is interesting to note is the hegemony 
of the American nationality of the (few) companies represented.321 The rather crass 
contradiction between the demands of the GNI principles that governments do not 
restrict human rights arbitrarily and the arbitrary rights to restrict fundamental rights 
that are contained in those same companies terms of service is also difficult to overlook.   
 
As regards China, when businesses decide to enter the Chinese market, they need to 
decide whether to follow the rules of the game, fight against them or exit the country, as 
Google did, for example.  
 
If they follow the rules of the game, they will be subject to the scrutiny of civil society 
and even found accountable in their home countries. That was the case of Microsoft, 
Yahoo, Cisco and Google, which were requested to give explanations to the US 
Congress in 2006 due to their unlawful practices in China.322  
 
On the other hand, fighting against the laws of the countries (or some of their aspects) 
leads to deterrent sanctions and even to the loss of administrative licenses. Following 
our previous example in the US, this approach has led to initiatives such as the bill on 
the Global Online Freedom Act (GOFA). It was drafted as a code of conduct that would 
have allowed the US to “guide” US companies on how to behave abroad so as to 
allegedly respect freedom of expression, the freedom to impart and receive information 
as well as to combat online censorship. Although considered in 2006 and then 
unsuccessfully reintroduced in 2007,323 this “voluntary” code of conduct was 
reawakened in 2012 324 and 2013,325 but has not advanced much yet. In any case, these 
voluntary codes of conduct have raised concerns among civil society because they are 
                                                          
321 See https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/participants/index.php (last visited on 17th June 2014). 
322 McMahon, R. (Ed.) and others, U.S. Internet Providers and the 'Great Firewall of China', 23rd 
February 2011, available at http://www.cfr.org/Internet-policy/us-Internet-providers-great-firewall-
china/p9856  (last visited on 16th June 2014). 
323  MacKinnon, R., Global Online Freedom Act is re-introduced, 11th January 2007, available at 
http://rconversation.blogs.com/rconversation/2007/01/global_online_f.html (last visited on 16th June 
2014). 
324 Cohn, C. and others, Global Online Freedom Act 2012 Is An Important Step Forward, 18th April 2012, 
available at https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/04/global-online-freedom-act (last visited on 16th June 
2014).  
325 US Global Online Freedom Act of 2013, available at http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th-
congress/house-bill/491 (last visited on 27th June 2015). 
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used by states to sometimes circumvent their positive and negative obligations vis-à-vis 
international human rights law.  
 
Finally, if foreign companies decided not to conduct business in China as a solution, 
this would not be enough, as this decision would not be sustainable and competitors 
may take the opposite decision – to the detriment of a competitive economy. First, even 
if companies left China, their competitors would replace them, which would undermine 
the former’s economic performance. Secondly, it is unlikely that only foreign 
companies would exert pressure on the Governing infrastructure of the People’s 
Republic of China. Still, “human rights are good for businesses”, as evidenced by the 
UN's Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. However, cases like the 
already-mentioned cases of Cisco or Google China reflect the need for improvement of 
both set of rights.326  
 
The codes of conduct or guidelines adopted by the international community tend to 
employ a rather vague and ambiguous wording. That creates legal uncertainty. The fact 
that they have a non-binding nature makes it inevitable that many human rights 
breaches will not be prevented. Even if States and other stakeholders gathered together 
to decide on better practices, there is a risk of perpetuation of abuses in the current 
international panorama. In a speech given on 12th June 2014 at the International IP 
Enforcement Summit in London, the US Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Matthew 
W. Barzun, captured it very well: 
“Companies exist to serve society; society does not exist to serve companies”. “In the 
private sector, we forget about it…”327 
 
Within the European Union, there is a lack of evidence-based impact assessments. As 
an alternative to other non-binding principles or recommendations, civil society and 
industry gathered together at the Stockholm Internet Forum in 2013 and suggested eight 
                                                          
326 Global Voices Advocacy, Human Rights Verdict Could Affect Cisco in China, 24th April 2013, 
available at http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2013/04/24/human-rights-verdict-could-affect-cisco-
in-china/; See the letter at http://www.bostoncommonasset.com/news/Investor-Statement-ATS-
FINAL.pdf (last visited on 14th June 2014). 
327 Barzun, M. W., speech given at the 2014 International IP Enforcement Summit in London, 12 th June 
2014, available at 
https://sslrelay.com/switchnewmedia.com/internationalipenforcementsummit/VOD/Matthew_W_Barzun_
Video_Archive.php (last visited on 13th June 2014) 
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criteria that could be used to assess the legality and effectiveness of “voluntary” 
measures taken by industry in order to achieve public policy objectives.  
 
First, if the process to conduct such measures is internal, it is more likely the measure 
will be effective. Second, it is important to ascertain whether the policy objective is 
initiated or supported by the intermediary to achieve a competitive advantage or to 
attain economic or societal benefits. Third, the competitiveness of the company is 
important when considering the overall impact on users. Fourth, the effectiveness and 
legality of “voluntary” measures need to be assessed vis-à-vis the policy objective 
pursued. Fifth, their democratic legitimacy is assessed by the law that is being 
implemented. In the case of China, for instance, this is a very important criterion. In the 
same vein, the sixth criterion tries to ascertain whether the measures have a different 
impact depending on the region in which they are implemented. Seventh, the legality 
and effectiveness of the “voluntary” measures implemented should also be assessed by 
the responsibility that a company may face in case of a mistaken or arbitrary decision by 
the intermediary. Additionally, it is important to ascertain the availability of effective 
redress to users. Finally, the eighth criterion is the collateral damage for liability 
exceptions.328 
 
Despite the criteria described above, there is a lack of a comprehensive and legally 
binding approach in the European Union, as an opinion of the EESC showed: 
“The success [of] self-regulation depends on several factors: the account they take of 
the general interest, the transparency of the system, the representativeness and skill of 
those involved, the existence of assessment and supervision mechanisms and the 
effectiveness of the monitoring - including sanctions if necessary - and a mutual spirit 
of partnership between the parties concerned and the public authorities and society in 
general.”329 
 
Finally, the EECS pointed out the importance of the 2003 Interinstitutional Agreement 
on better law making between the Commission, Parliament and Council,330 whose 
Article 17 clarifies that “self-regulation” should not be “applicable where fundamental 
                                                          
328 EDRi, SIF Unconference: Enforcement through "self-"Regulation – who ever thought this was a good 
idea?, 27th May 2013, available at https://edri.org/sif13/ (last visited on 28th June 2015). 
329 The EESC has even developed its own criteria, taken into account experiences of economic actors and 
input from scholars. Cf. EESC, Opinion on Self-regulation and co-regulation…, Op. cit. points 1.6 and 
5.21. 
330 European Commission, European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Interinstitutional 
Agreement on better law making, 2003, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2003:321:0001:0005:EN:PDF (last visited on 28th 
January 2015). 
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rights or important political options are at stake”.331 Yet, this is not always respected, 
since many of the measures adopted “voluntarily” by online companies put fundamental 
rights in conflict with public policy objectives. The EECS notes, however, that the 
interinstitutional agreement is not binding on third parties332 – which inter alia includes 
intermediaries. 
 
3. Grounds for companies to restrict Human Rights 
 
Besides the framework described in the precedent section to guide companies to respect 
human rights online, it is often the case that certain policy objectives of mutual 
agreement between countries are used as a means to implement measures which may 
infringe the rule of law and interfere with human rights and freedoms online. Human 
rights and freedoms can be invoked to justify an Internet control measure, such as 
blocking333 – to the detriment of other human rights and freedoms online. 
 
The most common examples relate to child protection, national security, including 
terrorism, among others. In this section, we examine the role of the intermediaries in the 
online world and the different approaches China has vis-à-vis the European Union and 
its Member states, such as the UK, which is a country that has a very developed Internet 
policy. In fact, the UK experience is an example of how careful we should be when 
invoking legitimate public interests of protection, because if not dealt with properly, 
they can lead to indiscriminate censorship without due control.334 
 
While the US accused China for spying on the US through undertakings like Huawei,335 
the US intelligence agency, the NSA, has been subject to severe criticism,336 notably 
since the Snowden revelations337 which started on 9th June 2013.338  
                                                          
331 Joe McNamee further develops this point. See, for instance, McNamee, J., Privatised online 
enforcement series…, Op. cit. 
332 EESC, Opinion on Self-regulation and co-regulation…, Op. cit. point 4.6. 
333 Callanan, C., Gercke, M, De Marco, E., and Dries-Ziekenheiner, H., Study: Internet blocking, 
balancing cybercrime responses in democratic societies, October 2009, p. 133, available at 
http://www.aconite.com/sites/default/files/Internet_blocking_and_Democracy.pdf (last visited on 28th 
June 2015). 
334 See, for instance, Moody, G., Russia And China Both Want To 'Protect Children’…Op. cit. 
335 U.S. House of Representatives, Investigative Report on the U.S. National Security Issues Posed by 
Chinese Telecommunications Companies Huawei and ZTE, 8th October 2012, available at 
https://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/Huawei-
ZTE%20Investigative%20Report%20(FINAL).pdf  (last visited on 14th June 2014). 
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Other countries like India, Australia or the UK have also expressed their concerns on 
the threats Huawei may cause to national security, especially due to its controversial 
relationship with the Chinese government.339 Yet, it is interesting to note that both their 
governments and companies set up in the aforementioned countries use Huawei’s 
services. For instance, Huawei worked together with TalkTalk in the construction of 
Homesafe340 in the United Kingdom, which is an opt-out filtering system launched in 
2011 to restrict access to certain content, e.g. related to pornography or gambling. As 
Tim Cushing asked himself, 
“[s]hould UK citizens be concerned their web traffic is being filtered by a company 
from a filter-heavy nation? Or should they be more concerned that control over content 
is being handed to a third-party private corporation rather than an independent 
organization that would be ultimately accountable to Parliament?”341 
 
In this section, we address the particular cases of child protection and then national 
security measures implemented in some of the Member states of the European Union. 
 
 Child protection 
 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child is a specific instrument targeted at protecting 
children’s rights. Usually, the Internet is conceived as being a dangerous tool for 
children. Conversely, potential and tangible benefits are often not given the importance 
they deserve.  
 
The Internet is a way to exercise the rights of the child. It promotes the right to 
education in a way that has never been experienced before. The Internet serves as a tool 
                                                                                                                                                                          
336 The privacy expert Simon Davies wrote a report analysing the impact of the Snowden revelations. Cf. 
The Privacy Surgeon (Davies, S., Ed.), A Crisis of Accountability. A global analysis of the impact of the 
Snowden revelations, June 2014, available at http://www.privacysurgeon.org/blog/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/Snowden-final-report-for-publication.pdf (last visited on 14th June 2014). 
337 See the documents that have been leaked so far at https://snowdenarchive.cjfe.org/greenstone/cgi-
bin/library.cgi (last visited on 28th June 2015). 
338 The Guardian, Edward Snowden: the whistleblower behind the NSA surveillance revelations, available 
at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveillance (last 
visited on 14th June 2014). There is an independent project in order to track all public documents related 
to the NSA: https://www.nsa-observer.net/ (last visited on 22nd January 2015). 
339 U.S. House of Representatives, Op. cit. pp. 25 and 26 
340Cf. http://www.talktalk.co.uk/security/homesafe-demo.html; http://www.huawei.com/ilink/en/success-
story/HW_196215 (last visited on 14th June 2014).  
341 Cushing, T., UK's Anti-Porn Filtering Being Handled By A Chinese Company, 25th July 2013, 
available at https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130725/20042323953/uks-anti-porn-filtering-being-
handled-chinese-company.shtml (last visited on 14th June 2014). 
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to spread knowledge, to promote the development of the personality of the child, to 
encourage self-determination and to help the child to become more mature. 
 
Most of the grounds for setting internet control measures to purportedly protect children 
can be considered as legitimate by default. Concerns arise in order to prevent online 
bullying, child pornography, hate speech, defamation, harassment, intimidation or 
discrimination based, for instance, on race or sex. Nonetheless, the approach adopted by 
the vast majority of countries and intermediaries is unbalanced. In the words of the 
former Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression, Frank LaRue, risks threatening children on the Internet are 
“overstated and used as an excuse for unduly restricting the rights of both adults and 
children”, such as freedom of expression. 342  
 
“Widespread restrictions on the use of digital communications and censorship are not 
only unacceptable but also ineffective solutions to these concerns”.343 Those restrictions 
are usually based on “vague” and “broad” conceptions of what harmful information is 
as well as on a “tacit acceptance of authoritarian attitudes”. 344 Additionally, differences 
in age are usually not taken into account.345 Thus, the concept of “children” includes 
individuals from the day they are born until their last years as a teenager, usually 16, 18 
or 21. As the former UN Special Rapporteur argued, however, 
 “[c]hildren’s freedom of expression does not —and cannot —start when children 
become capable of expressing their views autonomously or become teenagers; they 
cannot be expected to develop as autonomous beings and participants in society at the 
magical age of 18 years without having had the opportunity beforehand.”346 
 
Freedom of expression online is an obvious example of clear breaches that have been 
implemented in our society purportedly for protecting children. In general, measures 
placed by the State do not take into consideration the different levels of realisation of 
the child as he or she grows older, ‘paternalistic attitudes’ or underestimate the ability of 
the child to make choices or express himself or herself. 347 The same concerns can be 
                                                          
342 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion, 
21st August 2014, para. 3, available at https://www.crin.org/sites/default/files/freedomofexpression_2.pdf 
(last visited on 27th June 2015). 
343 Ibid, para. 4 
344 Ibid, para. 3.  
345 Ibid. 12. 
346 Ibid. 
347 Ibid, para. 34. 
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raised as regards measures applied by the ISP on a voluntary basis or encouraged by a 
government. 
 
It is interesting to note how China considers child protection in terms of policy and the 
measures put in place in the country to tackle the issues surrounding the protection of 
children. According to the Information Office of the State Council of the People's 
Republic of China, 
“The state guarantees online safety for minors. Minors have become China's biggest 
online group. By the end of 2009, a third of the country's 384 million Internet users 
were minors. The Internet is playing an increasingly important role in the development 
of minors. Meanwhile, online pornographic, illegal and harmful information is seriously 
damaging the physical and psychological health of young people, and this has become 
recognized as a prominent issue of public concern. The Chinese government attaches 
great importance to online safety for minors, and has always prioritized the protection 
of minors in the overall work of Internet information security programs. The Law of the 
People's Republic of China on the Protection of Minors348 stipulates that the state shall 
take measures to prevent minors from overindulging in the Internet; prohibit any 
organization or individual from producing, selling, renting or providing by other means 
electronic publications and Internet information containing pornography, violence, 
murder, terror, gambling or other contents harmful to minors. The state encourages 
research and development of Internet tools that are conducive to the online protection of 
minors, as well as Internet products and services suitable for minors. Families, schools 
and all other social units shall work together to protect minors online and create a 
healthy online environment for the development of minors. The Chinese government 
will actively push forward the "Mothers' Education Program" to help parents guide their 
children in using the Internet correctly.”349 
 
Whereas in China online intermediaries (mainly ISPs) face liability if they do not take 
measures to protect children, the EU and its Member States have a generally more 
comprehensive and just system. Yet, the EU is failing to address this legitimate interest 
with the most effective technology.350 Put simply, the EU system is not exempt from 
criticism either, as it has been criticised for not taking an evidence-based approach in 
policy-making.351 This is perhaps best illustrated by the almost complete absence (until 
                                                          
348 Law of the People's Republic of China on the Protection of Minors, 26th October 2012, available at 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=12626&lib=law&SearchKeyword=protection%20minors
&SearchCKeyword= (last visited on 28th January 2015). For instance, its Article 11 calls on parents to 
provide education to their children so as to fight against “internet addiction”. 
349 Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Op. cit. 
350 Alexandra Chernyavskaya and Professor Sara Livingston provided a guide which reflects an overview 
of the organisations which are working to protect children online. Cf. Chernyavskaya, A. and 
Livingstone, S., Children’s safety on the internet: a guide to stakeholders, London School of Economics 
and Political Science, Media Policy Project Blog, 31st March 2015, available at 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2015/03/31/childrens-safety-on-the-internet-a-guide-to-
stakeholders/ (last visited on 28th June 2015). 
351 See, for instance, Chernyavskaya, A., Evidence-based policymaking for provision of children’s rights 
online, London School of Economics and Political Science, Media Policy Project Blog, 24th June 2015, 
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recently) of statistics being collected – or requests for statistics to be collected – by 





As Edward Foster stated in 1951, “[w]e are willing enough to praise freedom when she 
is safely tucked away in the past and cannot be a nuisance. In the present, amidst 
dangers whose outcome we cannot foresee, we get nervous about her, and admit 
censorship.”353 But when should confidentiality give way to security?354 
 
There are several examples within the European Union of Member states which have 
implemented greater restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms online for the 
purposes of preserving national security, in general, or fighting against terrorism, in 
particular.  
 
Terrorism has become one of the biggest problems faced by mankind especially in 
recent times. According to Criminal Law Specialist Lamarca Pérez, antiterrorism 
legislation is where democratic states greater show an authoritarian tendency that 
seriously violates the efficiency of individual guarantees. Antiterrorism laws somewhat 
deny the rule of law.355 In order to exemplify this ground for restricting human rights 
and fundamental freedoms online through privatised enforcement, we chose France.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
available at http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2015/06/24/evidence-based-policymaking-for-
provision-of-childrens-rights-online/ (last visited on 28th June 2015). 
352 See, for instance, the lack of reliability of the statistics provided by the UK Internet Watch Foundation 
in its 2007 and 2008 annual reports. Cf. Libertus, Web sites: U.K. Internet Watch Foundation ("IWF") 
2008 & 2007 statistics, in Statistics Laundering: false and fantastic figures, 2009, available at 
http://libertus.net/censor/resources/statistics-laundering.html#iwfstats  (last visited on 4th August 2015).  
353 Kovarovic., K., When the Nation Springs a [Wiki]Leak: The 'National Security' Attack on Free 
Speech, Touro International Law Review, Vol. 14, Nº. 2, 14th May 2011, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1841923 (last visited on 13th July 2015). 
354 A.D. Moore tries to make a balance between privacy and security “while maintaining accountability”. 
In order to exemplify its theory, he includes a table which “measures privacy interests across several 
dimensions”. See, Moore, A.D., Privacy, Security, and Government Surveillance: WikiLeaks and the new 
Accountability, Public Affairs Quaterly, Vol. 25, Nº 2, April 2011, pp. 148-152, available at 
https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/cerl/conferences/ethicsofsecrecy/papers/reading/Moore.pdf (last 
visited on 13th July 2015).  
355 Lamarca Pérez, C. et al, Derecho Penal. Parte especial, Ed. Colex, 4th Edition, Madrid, 2008, p. 739. 
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Terrorism is being used as a reason for greater monitoring on (and off) line. Fighting 
against terrorist attacks is a valid and legitimate interest to protect. However, such 
public interest cannot be an excuse for blanket restrictions on our human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. 
 
At the beginning of January 2015, several people were killed at the headquarters of the 
satiric newspaper ‘Charlie Hebdo in Paris. After this tragic episode, the French 
government proposed a package of measures, further restricting privacy, increasing 
control measures on the Internet, enforcing communications data retention provisions 
and passenger name record storage for profiling purposes, among others.356  
 
We are of the opinion that such approach is not appropriate. As Hecker, an expert from 
the Institut Français des Relations Internationales, recalled, the last anti-terrorist law 
enacted in France before the “Loi au Renseignement” dated back from November 2014 
and that other counter-terrorism law did not prove helpful.357 In fact, from 2001 to date, 
France adopted several pieces of legislation to counter terrorism actions that included 
provisions related to the Internet. In addition, France had been retaining 
telecommunications and Passenger Name Records (PNR) for a long time now, but still 
failed to prevent the ‘Charlie Hebdo’ tragedy. 
 
The first terrorist law France enacted regarding the Internet dates back to 15th November 
2001,358 which followed the 11 September terrorist attacks in the US. . It authorised the 
use of surveillance technology and data retention obligations for telecommunication 
operators. 359 Moreover, it contained provisions reforming the French Criminal 
Procedural Code.360 For instance, since the entry into force of the anti-terrorist law, 
                                                          
356 See the official measures envisaged: Gouvernement Français, #Antiterrorisme : Manuel Valls annonce 
des mesures exceptionnelles, 21st January 2015, available at http://www.gouvernement.fr/antiterrorisme-
manuel-valls-annonce-des-mesures-exceptionnelles (last visited on 28th January 2015). 
357 Hecker, M., La menace terroriste en France, Institut Français des Relations Internationales, 9th 
January 2015, interview available at http://www.ifri.org/fr/publications/editoriaux/actuelles-de-lifri/jihad-
syrie-irak-un-defi-france (last visited on 11th January 2015). 
358 Loi [française] n° 2001-1062 du 15 novembre 2001 relative à la sécurité quotidienne, available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000222052&dateTexte=&categor
ieLien=id (last visited on 28th January 2015). 
359 Comité d'Experts sur le terrorisme, Profils nationaux relatifs à la capacité de lutte contre le 
terrorisme: France, Council of Europe, September 2013, p.3, available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/Country%20Profiles/Profiles%202013%20France_FR.pdf (last 
visited on 28th January 2015). 
360 “Code de procédure pénale français”, available at 
  Maryant Nathalie Fernández Pérez 
                 
 
 82 
Internet Control: assessing China in a comparative European context 
Article 230-1 of the French Criminal Procedural Code started allowing the public 
prosecutor and investigating and trial judges to order the use of national secret defence 
technical means to decrypt encrypted messages. This power has been extended to 
certain policy officers as of 14th November 2014.361  
 
On 29th August 2002, another law was enacted to merge several databases in order to 
preserve “internal security”. It is known as “LOPSI”.362 One year later, on 18th March 
2003, the LOPSI was promulgated363 to extend the obligation on operators to retain and 
disclose their communication data. On 21st June 2004, France adopted a law on trust in 
the Digital economy, according to which the police could incorporate devices like 
cameras or microphones in vehicles and private homes without notifying or providing a 
justification to the owner of this invasion of his or her privacy.364  
 
On 23rd January 2006, France adopted another law.365 It was aimed at intensifying 
sanctions, the control of the Internet and the interception of communications, such as 
phone communications. On 22nd January 2009, a decree366 developed this law so as to 
reinforce the video-surveillance measures which were in force after the 2006 legislation. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do;jsessionid=56FC6E2ACAD19750B5D2F073F07E3AC0.tpd
ila16v_3?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006071154&dateTexte=20150804 (last visited on 4th August 2015). 
361 According to the latest reform of this Article, “officiers de police judiciaire” can be granted 
authorisation by the public prosecutor or a judge to order the decryption of encrypted communications, 
resorting to national defence mechanisms which are considered as state secrets. 
362 Loi [française] n° 2002-1094 du 29 août 2002 d'orientation et de programmation pour la sécurité 
intérieure, available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000780288 (last visited on 28th 
January 2015). 
363 Loi [française] n° 2003-239 du 18 mars 2003 pour la sécurité intérieure, available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000005634107&dateTexte=vig (last 
visited on 28th January 2015). 
364  Loi [française] n° 2004-575 du 21 juin 2004 pour la confiance dans l'économie numérique, available 
athttp://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000801164&dateTexte=&categ
orieLien=id (last visited on 28th January 2015). 
365 Loi [française] n° 2006-64 du 23 janvier 2006 relative à la lutte contre le terrorisme et portant 
dispositions diverses relatives à la sécurité et aux contrôles frontaliers, available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000454124&dateTexte=&categor
ieLien=id (last visited on 28th January 2015). 
366  Décret [français] n° 2009-86 du 22 janvier 2009 modifiant le décret n° 96-926 du 17 octobre 1996 
relatif à la vidéosurveillance, available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000020146614&dateTexte=&categor
ieLien=idblank (last visited on 28th January 2015). 
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On 14th March 2011, the LOPSI was updated.367 This reform included provisions that 
contributed to Internet censorship, extended police databases, introduced body scanners 
and enhanced the utilisation of surveillance cameras.368 
 
On 13th November 2014, France adopted another law by accelerated procedure 369 so as 
to reinforce the existing provisions to fight against terrorism.370 France strengthened 
Internet control by inter alia allowing administrative authorities (such as the police) to 
require ISPs to block certain content on the basis of a public interest reason without a 
court order. Due to the concerns raised to freedom to receive and information, freedom 
of movement or freedom of expression,371 civil society organisations like La Quadrature 
du Net launched a campaign to raise public awareness on the dangers of this French 
law372, but did not prevent its adoption. The “Loi au renseignement” suffered the same 
fate. On 24th June 2015, it was adopted by the National legislative Assembly. However,, 
on 25th June 2015, more than sixty members of parliament and the President of the 
Senate appealed it before the French Constitutional Court (the ‘Conseil 
constitutionnel’), 373although without success.374 The aforementioned civil society 
organisation announced plans to challenge the law before the ECtHR.375 
 
                                                          
367  Loi [française] n° 2011-267 du 14 mars 2011 d'orientation et de programmation pour la performance 
de la sécurité intérieure (LOPSI II), available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000023707312&dateTexte=&categor
ieLien=id (last visited on 28th January 2015). 
368 Fiedler, K., Patriot Act à la française: Braucht Frankreich weitere Überwachungsmaßnahmen?, 26th 
January 2015, available at https://netzpolitik.org/2015/franzoesischer-patriot-act-
ueberwachungsmassnahmen/ (last visited on 28th January 2015). 
369 Reporteurs Sans Frontières, La liberté d’information menacée au nom de l’urgence terroriste, 18th July 
2014, available at http://fr.rsf.org/france-la-liberte-d-information-menacee-18-07-2014,46659.html (last 
visited on 8th January 2015). 
370 Loi [française] n° 2014-1353 du 13 novembre 2014 renforçant les dispositions relatives à la lutte 
contre le terrorisme, available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000029754374&dateTexte=&categor
ieLien=id (last visited on 8th January 2015). 
371 Cf. Ibid, Articles 1, 5, 9 and 12. 
372 See their campaign at https://presumes-terroristes.fr/ (last visited on 28th June 2015). 
373 Projet de loi relatif au renseignement, Legislative dossier, France, available at http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/14/dossiers/renseignement.asp (last visited on 28th June 2015). 
374 Only three articles (or some references contained therein) were declared unconstitutional by the French 
Constitutional Court. Cf. French Constitutional Court, ruling No. 2015-713 DC of 23rd July 2015, 
available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/acces-par-
date/decisions-depuis-1959/2015/2015-713-dc/decision-n-2015-713-dc-du-23-juillet-2015.144138.html 
(last visited on 4th August 2015). 
375 La Quadrature du Net, Publication d'un mémoire citoyen au Conseil Constitutionnel contre la loi 
Renseignement !, 23rd June 2015, available at http://www.laquadrature.net/fr/publication-dun-memoire-
citoyen-au-conseil-constitutionnel-contre-la-loi-renseignement (last visited on 5th August 2015). 
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At the EU level, reactions appeared very quickly as well. Right after the terrorist attack, 
the Ministers of Internal Affairs of Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Italy, 
Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, the United Kingdom and Sweden joined the French 
Minister of Interior and issued a declaration on 11th January 2015. They asked for 
legislation on passenger name record retention and profilng, more telecommunications 
data retention and an increase of the control of the Internet.376 While they foresaw 
measures to fight against terrorism and radicalisation online, they considered it 
appropriate to create a non-defined forum of internet ISPs, while “scrupulously” 
observing fundamental freedoms and respecting the law.377 However, there are not clear 
rules in the laws of the Member states or the EU itself to counterbalance the obligation 
to preserve a legitimate aim of public interest. Looking at the expansive policing 
measures being demanded of these same companies by the US draft Cybersecurity 
Information Sharing Act378, the notion that the “voluntary” forum will respect the spirit 
and letter of, for example, Article 52 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, is far 
from clear. 
 
Similarly, the European Commission also reacted by foreseeing counter-terrorist actions 
for the near future in terms of EU policy.379 On 28th April 2015, the European 
Commission launched a European Agenda on Security.380 Among its priorities, the 
Commission re-stated the goal already mentioned by the joint-statement of the Ministers 
of the Interior: the creation of “an EU Forum with IT companies to help counter terrorist 
propaganda and addressing concerns about new encryption technologies”.381 In other 
words, a forum to implement “voluntary” measures to tackle terrorism online, without 
any accountability in case companies over- or under-implement the measures they are 
                                                          
376 Meyer, D., EU’s response to free speech killings? More internet censorship, Gigaom, 11th January 
2015, https://gigaom.com/2015/01/11/eu-response-to-free-speech-killings-more-internet-censorship/ (last 
visited on 11th January 2015). 
377 Cazeneuve, B. (coord.), Joint statement, Paris, 11th January 2015, available at 
https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Kurzmeldungen/gemeinsame-
erklaerung.pdf?__blob=publicationFile (last visited on 29th June 2015).  
378 US Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, S.754 , 114th  Congress (2015-2016), available at 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/754 (last visited on 4th July 2015). 
379 European Commission, Press Release - La lutte contre le terrorisme au niveau européen : présentation 
des actions, mesures et initiatives de la Commission européenne, 11th January 2015, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-3140_fr.htm (last visited on 11th January 2015). 
380 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: The European 
Agenda on Security, COM(2015) 185 final, Strasbourg, 28th April 2015, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/basic-
documents/docs/eu_agenda_on_security_en.pdf (last visited on 29th June 2015). 
381 Ibid, p. 16. 
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encouraged to take, such as blocking, filtering of or taking down content or informal 
data sharing.382 
 
In sum, the situation in the European Union counts with more guarantees for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms online than in China. Nevertheless, this does not mean 
that the EU system is not exempt of criticism. On the contrary, measures undertaken 




While providing an overview of the Internet situation in China in comparison with the 
European Union and some of its Member states, we sought to demonstrate the situation 
in China vis-à-vis human rights restrictions online is not that different from the situation 
in the European Union. The EU and its Member States have more protective legal and 
political frameworks. The EU has democracy foundations. China does not. Yet, there 
are five main reasons which demonstrate there are more similarities than what one may 
think.  
 
First, both Parties have different Internet governance models. However, both models 
can be criticised. In addition, the different models are leading to similar policy-making 
decisions. 
 
One the one hand, China defends national sovereignty over the Internet (interstate 
model) and countries like EU Member States, formally support a free, open and bottom-
up multistakeholder system (multistakeholderism). Yet, multistakeholderism is leading 
to a set of irregularities. 
 
China’s vision of the Internet is that each nation must retain the power to control 
Internet policies. Consequently, no other country or international actor can undermine 
its sovereignty, even within a context of international cooperation. China acknowledges 
that it is not possible to isolate itself. Hence, it uses all international mechanisms to its 
benefit, as any international actor would do. It fosters further ‘democratisation’ in the 
                                                          
382 Fiedler, K., EU Commission set to re-brand the failed CleanIT project, 3rd June 2015, available at 
https://edri.org/eu-commission-rebrand-failed-cleanit-project/ (last visited on 29th June 2015). 
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decision process so it can ensure it is going to be heard and be able to persuade others. 
That trend has been already tested in NETmundial, where China submitted its view on 
how the Internet should be regulated, together with Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.  
 
Inside the EU, the nature of the power over the Internet is changing. In fact, the 
European Union is living in an era in which all multistakeholders wish to advocate what 
is best for them or for the interests they represent.  
 
On the other hand, differences related to how China and the EU wish to govern the 
Internet have led to similar outcomes in terms of Internet regulation. In fact, there is a 
tendency in Europe to implement mechanisms of control outside the rule of law with 
similar effects although justified on public interest grounds. How effectively human 
rights online can be protected by all stakeholders while pursuing other public policies is 
a challenge that EU is facing and, as we have seen, not addressing very well. 
 
Second, we acknowledged that China has an innumerable number of Internet users as 
compared to the total number of Internet users. However, Internet penetration is not 
uniform. In the European Union, Internet penetration is still a problem. As stated 
elsewhere, while “100% of Europeans now have access to broadband”,383 out of all EU 
citizens, 20% “have never used the internet. Rural areas are not provided with a high 
speed broadband, and given that nearly half of the Europeans lack sufficient information 
and communications technology (ICT) skills, it is obvious that access is not equivalent 
to broadband subscription or actual usage. Accordingly, the European Commission 
[itself] recognises there is still room for improvement.”384 
 
Third, the “Internet’s open architecture is under attack from multiple directions”.385 As 
Kulesza puts it, the Internet has “changed more than just the perception of human 
rights”, but it has also changed the role of governments and companies.386 China mainly 
deploys three forms of Internet control, namely censorship, arbitrary intermediary 
                                                          
383 European Commission, Scoreboard 2014 - Progress Report Digital Agenda Targets 2014, 28th May 
2014, available at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/scoreboard-2014-progress-report-digital-
agenda-targets-2014 (last visited on 1st July 2015). 
384 Fernández Pérez, M., EC’s Scoreboard 2014…, Op. cit.  
385 Landau, S., Surveillance or Security? The Risks Posed by New Wiretapping Technologies, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010, p. 34 
386 Kulesza, J., Op. cit., p. 2. 
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intervention and self-censorship. In the European Union, there are many countries and 
companies whose measures are leading to control the Internet in a non-proportionate, 
untested way. The end product is more similar than what would have seemed likely just 
a few years ago. 
 
Fourth, the Internet facilitates the enhancement of human rights and freedoms online. 
Notwithstanding its benefits, the Internet is posing many threats to human rights, such 
as freedom of expression and the right to privacy, resulting in loss of trust in the 
system.387 This is a clear reality in China. In the European Union, restrictions to human 
rights are taking place and growing at a precipitous rate. 
 
Fifth, the greatest threat to human rights and fundamental freedoms online in both 
China and the EU come from the role of intermediaries. While in China, intermediaries 
face liability, in Europe the legal regime is more protective. However, there is 
increasing pressure to change this.388 This is an inherent threat, as the Internet is a 
public space that is privately owned. Companies do not have the same obligations to 
respect human rights as States have. Europe is not an exception. More and more 
companies are being “encouraged” to take measures which bypass the rule of law. 
Power without responsibility is never good and never sustainable. 
 
Ultimately, the real impact international practices have on the Chinese Internet policies 
is yet to be seen. So far, it seems more likely that in the near future China will be of 
inspiration to many countries than the other way around in the sense that instead of 
promoting and protecting digital rights, more challenges will arise. Overall, China may 
                                                          
387 MacDonald, R., Ben-Avie, J. and Carrion, F., Internet freedom and the right to private life, protection 
of personal data and due process of law, Report drafted by Access for the Council of Europe, 
MCM(2013)008, 2013, p. 5. 
388 See, for instance, Section 3(3) of the Digital Single Market Communication of the European 
Commission or the European Parliament’s draft report on terrorist radicalisation and recruitment online. 
Cf. Respectively, European Commission, A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe , Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2015) 192 final, Brussels, 6th May 2015, available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/digital-single-market/docs/dsm-communication_en.pdf (last visited on 5th 
August 2015) and European Parliament (rapporteur Dati, R.,), Draft report on prevention of radicalisation 
and recruitment of  European citizens by terrorist organisations, 2015/2063(INI), Committee on Civil 
Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, 1st June 2015, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
%2f%2fEP%2f%2fNONSGML%2bCOMPARL%2bPE-
551.967%2b01%2bDOC%2bPDF%2bV0%2f%2fEN (last visited on 5th August 2015). 
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not be the greatest example of promotion and protection of civil rights and liberties in 
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